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                                                       Introduction

The status of Turkey as a candidate member state of the European Union (EU) has interested opponents and supporters of accession alike. The most interesting part is that although accession negotiations have begun in 2005, they haven’t made much progress after the suspension of the negotiations in 2006. Negotiations had been opened in 19 of the 35 chapters; however, eight of these have been suspended abiding the (improvement of) Turkish relations with the Greek-Cypriots.​[1]​ Turkey itself is starting to consider other possibilities, as opposed to pursuing full EU membership. Although initially Turkey’s politicians, elites and civilians were enthusiastic about the potential of EU membership, the mood has changed since 2005.​[2]​ The Turks are feeling betrayed in their promise that Turkey is a part of Europe and should be treated as such. To the Turks, being a part of Europe includes unconditional membership of the EU. As both the EU and Turkey gear up for yet another decisive year ahead in reinitiating of the negotiations, the question remains; why is it that these negotiations precede with such difficulty? 
Turkey’s accession process is not the first in the history of enlargement of the EU to experience some delays. Several other enlargements – 1973, 1986 – experienced similar problems. Lorena Ruano develops a theory concerning the EU’s strategy in enlargement negotiations in Origin and Implications of the European’s Union’s Enlargement Procedure (2002).​[3]​ According to Ruano the European Economic Cooperation (EEC)/EU has developed a method for conducting accession negotiations that can best be defined as the ‘bilateral format’, in which negotiations are conducted with the EEC/EU representing itself as one entity. Ruano deduces that the bilateral format has several complicating aspects for the negotiations. First of all, the format ensures that the interests of the member states prevail over the interests of the accession seeking party – as the member states control the agenda and thus have a tendency to under-represent the interests of the potential new member. Secondly, the bilateral format makes the Community inflexible in their positions and presents the other negotiating party with ‘take it or leave it’ circumstances. Preceding the presentation of a common position to the applicant state is a round of intense negotiations, as so many member states wish to see their deal breakers included in an accession agreement. Thirdly, the bilateral format pushes the candidates to accept ‘tough’ EC proposals by allowing difficult chapters to be decided at the last possible moment. And finally, the EEC/EU negotiations format strengthens the EEC/EU positions because none of the enlargements should halt the development of the EEC/EU, as was decided in 1961. This in turn implies that the ‘acquis communautaire’ – the legal framework of the EEC/EU – turned into a ‘moving target’ for the candidates to comply with. 
In order to find out why the Turkish case is experiencing so many difficulties, it could and would be interesting to analyze the Turkish accession so far, and that of a previous candidate member state. Examining if Ruano’s conclusions on the bilateral format hold up when applying them to the Turkish case could perhaps shed some light on the slow pace of the negotiations with Turkey. Evaluating other enlargements, Spain seems to share a reasonable amount of conditions with Turkey prior to and during the candidate status. Spain now is a country that has transformed itself from a dictatorial state into one of the leading countries in the European Union.​[4]​ Spain is a highly respected member state of the EU. Nevertheless it wasn’t until the death of the Spanish dictator Franco in 1975 that the EEC seriously considered Spain as more than just a commercial trading partner. Just before Franco’s death a process that can best be described as a ‘gradual transition’ had been set in motion, trying to turn Spain to democracy. The real power boost that stimulated this process came after Franco’s death, and the new democratic Spain looked for ways to consolidate their fragile democracy.​[5]​ Full membership of the democratic union, the EEC, appeared to be Spain’s best option.​[6]​ 
Just as in the Turkish case, the accession of Spain was considered with a certain amount of apprehension and criticism from within the EEC. Furthermore, the talks between Spain and the then EEC were most certainly not the first nor the last in EEC/EU history to linger on for a long time, running from 1977 until granting Spain full membership in 1986​[7]​. William Chislett, author of Spanish Trajectory: a source of inspiration for Turkey? makes a convincing case of the similarities between two countries at the time of the accession. Surprising it may be, but according to Chislett Turkey and Spain share certain developments and characteristics throughout their history and their present state of affairs. These similarities may have occurred at different moments in time but should not be overlooked as they are significant.​[8]​ 
Although several key differences between the two countries do remain, and in his research Chislett does describe the two most important dissimilarities. First of all, and presumably the most significant one, is that Spain has a catholic/Christian background, whereas Turkey comes from a Muslim/Islamic background.​[9]​ The EU is primarily a grouping of Christian states, which could suggest that Turkey would have to work a little bit harder to prove itself worthy for membership of the EU. Furthermore, Turkey’s social and economic standards of 2005 compared to the EU’s standards in 2005 are less favorable than Spain’s in 1986, compared to the EEC in 1986. The social and economic disparities of Spain and the EEC seemed a lot easier to overcome than seems to be the case for Turkey.​[10]​ Even though Chislett makes some excellent points on why Spain and Turkey can be compared, his research primarily focuses on Spain’s hurdles such as the influence of the army, and Spain áfter the accession to the EEC. In order to find out why the accession negotiations with Turkey are moving at such a slow pace, it would be interesting to study Spain and Turkey during their respective pre-accession phases and how the negotiations were/will be influenced by the negotiation framework of the EEC/EU. This leads me to the main question for this research;
To what extent did/do the interests and/or the format of the accession negotiations result in obstructions regarding the accession negotiations between the EEC/EU and Spain/Turkey?

Was it because of the conflicting interests of Spain and the EEC in the negotiations, or was it because the format of the negotiations between the EEC and Spain complicated matters? In this research, interests signify the expectations that Spain and the EEC had for enlargement. Format indicates the way negotiations were/are conducted between Spain/Turkey and the EEC/EU. In all accession negotiations of the EEC (and currently the EU) with a candidate member state the negotiations were based upon a bilateral format.​[11]​ Examining whether interests or the format obstructed a swift integration of Spain into the EEC could be interesting. Equally as interesting would it be to investigate the same factors for Turkey. Are the delays in the negotiations caused by faulty negotiation techniques or do the interests truly dominate the negotiations agenda? Spain has been a member state since 1986, thus the conflicting interests have been overcome. However, the bilateral format is still in place, applied once more in the Turkish accession negotiations. How does this influence the Turkish case? 
         In order to provide an answer to the main question, I will examine the two acceding countries in their respective paths towards accession. For the Spanish accession the negotiations were hindered in two particular policy chapters;  







                          
 Common Agricultural Policy 
Agriculture was the primary source of income for most of Spain’s workforce at the time​[12]​, and the sector was heavily subsidized by the Spanish government. Spain produced a number of so called Mediterranean products such as olive oil, vegetables and tomatoes, and a selection of fruits in a more efficient and low-priced manner than was done in Europe.​[13]​ This sparked fear within Europe that farmers from for example France would face inequitable competition with these cheaper products from Spain.​[14]​ Resolving the issues surrounding the implementation of the CAP in Spain proved to be crucial for the membership negotiations.​[15]​ 

 Free Movement of Workers
In the 1960’ies and seventies a substantial number of Spaniards had migrated from the southern peninsula to the EEC in order to achieve some prosperity as a guest worker. After the opening of the negotiations some feared that this number of Spaniards migrating would increase dramatically due to the Freedom of Movement of Workers.​[16]​ Through addressing the Spanish regional disparities by setting up a regional fund for Spain the EEC hoped to increase prosperity in Spain. The EEC anticipated that this would keep the northern bound migration movements from Spain within limits.​[17]​ Furthermore, the EEC created a ‘Mediterranean Plan’ to improve the economic and social situation in the Mediterranean countries of the EEC – Portugal, Spain and Greece.​[18]​





























                            Spain – negotiating the CAP and FMOW


1.1 General information and history

In January 1986 Spain achieved full membership of the EEC, putting an end to one of the most difficult enlargement negotiations in the history of the European Community. Several factors contributed to the long duration of the negotiations, which started in 1979. First of all, the impact that the EEC’s newest member would have – a country of nearly 36 million inhabitants in 1975​[19]​ , and a territory of 505.000km2​[20]​, alarmed the Community of Nine. The industrial growth potential in Spain was enormous, with its large and primarily young population. Next to that, there was a certain amount of apprehension in the community about the influence Spain would be able to exercise after accession, due to Spain’s size. The number of delegates to the EEC was (and still is) based upon a member state’s demographics.  As the Community was still recuperating from the 1973 enlargement which installed a new division of power, another round of allocating delegates among the member states seemed unappealing. However, the most significant points of friction in Spain’s accession negotiations were the integration of Spain into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and (to a lesser extent) the Freedom of Movement of Workers. 

1.1.1 History of relations between Spain and Europe 

Prior to full membership of the European Community, Spain had been in a military dictatorship under ‘Generalissimo’ Franco for nearly 40 years. Spain had cut all political ties with the western European countries after Franco’s victory in 1936, and attempted to revive itself after WW II without help of the USA and the Marshall Plan. This had consequently led to an isolation of the southern peninsula, and Spain seriously fell behind the western Europeans in terms of wealth and development. In the north-west of Europe economic ties were growing ever closer with the establishment of the ECSC and later on the EEC/EC, and the level of wealth continued to grow. Spain on the other hand tried to be self-sufficient and thus tried not to rely on the other European countries. As time went by, it became apparent that Spain needed the prosperous west to prosper itself. Therefore, according to Franco, the relationship with European Community had to be renewed, and Spain formally applied for membership in 1962.​[21]​ The Community, which prided itself on its democratic platform,​[22]​ denied this first real approach.  
While denying Spain full membership, the Community saw no harm in relations with Spain on a purely commercial basis. Both parties came together in 1964 and held exploratory talks for such an arrangement, which truly took off in 1967 and were concluded in 1970 with the signing of the EEC-Spain agreement.​[23]​ This preferential agreement was drafted to stimulate trade between the two parties by reducing tariff barriers. After a number of years, the agreement would transform into a free trade agreement.​[24]​ The agreement underpinned the Community’s desire to improve trade relations with countries bordering the Mediterranean for commercial reasons, without appearing to give its approval to the dictatorships in the region.​[25]​ For Spain it was a way of stimulating the new up and coming middle-class, as well as promoting its developing industry. In the early 1970’ies, the Spanish society had dramatically changed: it became modernized and capitalistic as opposed to ‘closed’ and state-oriented.​[26]​  It might have been slow and hardly noticed, but Spain was already starting to change its dictatorial ways in favor of democracy​[27]​, ‘as the Spaniards said, the Dictadura (hard dictatorship) had become a Dictablanda (soft dictatorship)’.​[28]​ Nonetheless, it wasn’t until the death of Franco in 1975 that the Community truly opened its doors to Spain, and Spain opened itself to democracy. 
The change of regime under King Juan Carlos I from dictatorial to democratic was greatly welcomed by the Community​[29]​, and it did not take long for the EEC to acknowledge these transformations in Spain. New negotiations for the old EEC- Spain agreement were necessary after the regime change and due to the Community’s latest enlargement in 1973. It wasn’t unexpected that immediately after the first democratic elections were held in Spain in June 1977, the new Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Areilza formally presented the then President-in-Office of the Council, Belgian Minister Mr. Simonet, with his President Suarez’s request for Spain’s accession on July 28th 1977.​[30]​ This request came just after the applications for accession by Greece (June 1975) and Portugal (March 1977).​[31]​ The Commission acknowledged Spain’s appeal in November 1977, and deemed Spain ready for entry in November 1978. Negotiations with Spain were officially opened in Brussels on February 5th 1979.​[32]​ 

1.1.2 The build-up to the opening of the accession negotiations
 
The Community was keen to accept this new democratic country into their midst. In the EEC’s perspective, the accession of Spain would not only stabilize the new democracy but it would also consolidate the new democratic principles​[33]​, and steer off any communist red danger. The treaty of Rome had previously reaffirmed the Community’s desire to embrace countries seeking to preserve peace and liberty, so enlarging the Community with Spain would be in compliance with these principles.​[34]​ Spain at the same time could not wait to join. Spain had nowhere else to go – Europe was the best option in matters of development, prosperity and trade. Not only were the elites ready to strengthen the democracy, the public too was overwhelmingly pro-Europe​[35]​. Besides, to the Spaniards it was a matter of ‘rejoining’ Spain’s rightful place among the European countries after a long time of waiting at the sidelines.​[36]​ In no way did the Spaniards think they didn’t belong in Europe. 
King Juan Carlos even stressed European integration in his first public address, by saying ‘the idea of Europe would be incomplete without a reference to the presence of the Spaniards and without consideration of the activity of my predecessors. Europe should reckon with Spain and we Spaniards are Europeans!’​[37]​ However, some groupings continued to try to destabilize the democracy. Separatist aspirations sought to threaten the new democratic institutions by using terrorism to scare the public and politicians.​[38]​ The most dramatic episode of opposing the democracy occurred in early 1981, when members of the old military establishment tried to restore the military power by threatening to overthrow the democracy with a coup d’état. The new King’s firm commitment to democracy prevented the coup from gaining momentum, but these escalations very much stressed the importance of consolidating the still fragile and embryonic democracy of Spain.​[39]​ 
As previously mentioned, the negotiations between the Community and Spain formally began on the 5th of February 1979. For new admittances into the European group, accession was and is a matter of adopting the ‘Acquis Communautaire’ into their national legal framework. Not too long into the negotiations did it become clear that resolving the issues surrounding the integration of Spain into the Community’s CAP (especially), and to a lesser extent the Free Movement of Workers were going to be essential for a successful conclusion of the negotiations. Both matters were considered complicated, as so many policy areas would be affected by the outcome of these negotiations. The levels of linkage between the different chapters of negotiations forced the Community’s policy makers to first check and double-check if there was agreement between the Community’s members on their position before presenting it to Spain.​[40]​ This was done to prevent any ambiguities and thus trouble during the negotiations. Opposition from France and Italy was fierce, with French and Italian farmers even using violence to prevent Spanish agricultural products entering the EEC.​[41]​  











1.2 Common Agricultural Policy

1.2.1 Problems and expectations Spain

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) turned out to be the most difficult chapter in the accession negotiations between the EEC and Spain. Often the negotiations on the CAP delayed the closing of other policy chapters. During the beginning and the closing of the negotiations Spain’s agriculture was an important feature of the country’s economy. The importance of agriculture wasn’t comparable to the importance of agriculture on the Community’s market.​[42]​ About 22% of the labourers in Spain found employment in the agricultural sector, as opposed to 9.7% in the Community of Nine.​[43]​ Adding Spain’s sector to the Common Market would signify an increase of the Community’s agricultural market by a third.​[44]​ Further complicating was Spain’s agriculture system which was based on a structure of small farms and rapidly aging farmers, a structure different from the farms within the EEC.​[45]​ Although the potential threat to the Common Market didn’t come from the Spanish dairy products, certain other ‘sensitive products’ caused friction between the negotiating parties. These sensitive products were the so called Mediterranean products, as they were primarily produced in the Mediterranean area. Including citrus fruits, tomatoes, potatoes, wine and olive oil, the Spanish products would surpass the production rate of the EEC while at the same time keeping production costs low. Spain’s production at the time already surpassed that of the EEC, and the estimated growth of the Spanish production fields was projected to be significant.​[46]​ 
Fear in the member states of the anticipated production rate of Spain wasn’t entirely unjustified. More than half of the country’s territory was used as farmland (approximately 275.000 km2).​[47]​ The prices of the agricultural products in Spain were well beneath the Community’s tariff standards, especially those of olive oil. The Spanish farmers could supposedly increase their profits after accession as the Spanish products would no longer be subject to tariff barriers. The new level playing field on the Common Market implied that the sale numbers of the Spanish products would increase as they were less expensive then the EEC products. Reassured as the Spanish farmers would be by these increasing sale numbers, intensifying the production of agricultural goods would be the practical next step for the Spanish farmers.​[48]​ However, these same farmers were bound to the dry climate and varying landscape of Spain, which had led to production inefficiency. The climate and landscape made it difficult to properly irrigate the Spanish farmlands. The Spanish government had previously sought to overcome this inefficiency by financially assisting the farmers with the installment of irrigation machinery.​[49]​ Nonetheless, the amount of irrigated land before accession continued to be small​[50]​, but with the Community’s pre-accession support there would be sufficient funds to expand irrigation and therefore production onto larger fields.
Finally, Spain expected difficulties after abolishing the protectionist measures that had been put in place by the Spanish government to assist the agricultural sector. The Spanish government had previously supported their farmers through a system based on intervention at two levels:​[51]​
‘* Intervention at the production level, which may take the form of a restriction of cultivated acreage (e.g. rice, tobacco), controlled planting (vines), fixing of the volume of production (e.g. sugar beet and sugar cane, hops) or fixing of the maximum expenditure for State intervention in the relevant sector
* Intervention in the market, involving, depending on the direction of movement of prices, virtually the entire range of traditional measures (storage and release from storage, limitation on imports or exports, subsidies)’
This system of guaranteed price support and state intervention at production and market level would have to cease as soon as Spain joined the EEC. The production of the Mediterranean crops would not suffer from the cutback in financial assistance, alarming certain member states. However, other sectors would be unable to survive without the interventionist measures. Especially the Spanish dairy production would go overboard after accession, where it would have to compete with the north of Europe. The northern areas had developed an often more efficient technique for the production of dairy.​[52]​ Next to that, the northern markets were heavily subsidized by the EEC. The north of Spain was the primary producer of dairy within Spain; the tough European competition and the consequences could increase the regional disparities in Spain. 

1.2.2 Problems and expectations EEC

Enlargement raised certain concerns for the EEC. One of the more important issues at hand was how the enlargement would affect their relationship with other Mediterranean Non Member Countries (MNMC’s). These countries had previously drawn up trade agreements with the Community. The MNMC’s included the acceding countries – Spain, Greece – but also Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and Turkey, to name a few. Although this Mediterranean policy had some flaws, in a sense that it continuously favored the EEC’s domestic markets​[53]​, the trade agreements did facilitate importing the majority of the produced crops in the Mediterranean countries into the EEC.​[54]​ However, after the accession of Spain these trade agreements would no longer be useful. Spain would make the European market for Mediterranean products self-sufficient; henceforth there would be no need for additional imports.​[55]​ The task that lay ahead for the Community was to incorporate these Mediterranean countries into the enlarged Community. Even though the Community did not need the imports after accession, the EEC depended on the Mediterranean for transit routes for fuel and raw material supplies​[56]​ and thus wanted to maintain an unwavering relationship. In addition, the Mediterranean’s slowly developing industry largely depended on its trade commitments to the EEC. To continue the industrial and economical development of the MNMC’s​[57]​ the Community did not want to cut ties with the Mediterranean after the enlargement. Nevertheless, the improvement of democracy in the region was what mattered most to the EEC. To terminate the trade agreements prematurely might necessitate the Mediterranean countries to turn to other potential trading partners in the world, such as the Middle East. As the EEC preferred to keep the implementation of democracy going forward in the Mediterranean, any alternative that included contact with less-favored regions in the world for the Mediterranean was unacceptable to the EEC.​[58]​ 
A second issue was the production estimates of Spain’s agricultural market as well as estimates of its industries. This potential scared the member states and especially the member states’ farmers. These concerns stemmed from the economic crisis that had hit the world in 1973, and the EEC was still trying to recuperate from the consequences. Protectionist measures had already been set up within the EEC. After the enlargement the Community intended to keep to protection of the domestic market a priority. However, enlargement with young and capable industries could endanger the cohesion in the Common Market as the measures would have to be adjusted to fit in the new industries. The consequences potentially jeopardized the internal cohesion of the Community. Although the Community had warmly welcomed Spain back into Europe, the cohesion of the Community was and remained more important than the addition new members.​[59]​ The general consensus in the Community was that the EEC sectors that would suffer most from enlargement should be protected. This mindset implied that Spain should accept the Community’s demands, not the other way around. The Community’s attitude added the problem of placing the Community’s sectoral interests above the benefits of enlargement throughout the negotiations​[60]​, consequently delaying the negotiations considerably. 
Olive oil and wine were at the centre of the dispute of Spain and the EEC in terms of sectoral interests. Before the accession of Spain, olive oil and wine were already rapidly approaching the resources ceiling for production within the Community.​[61]​ The accession of Greece in 1981 had made the communal market for olive oil in the Community self-sufficient, which meant that adding Spain to the market would mean a constant surplus in EEC production.​[62]​ Additionally, Spain happened to be the largest producer of olive oil in the world. Combining the EEC market and Spain’s would make Europe accountable for 83% of the world production.​[63]​ The percentages were one of the key reasons that the Community had been somewhat hesitant about Spain’s efforts to improve its production efficiency in the years before applying for accession. The application had consequently made Spain eligible for pre-accession funds which were used to improve the competence of the agricultural products. The same subsidies were another obstacle for the EEC – incorporating Spain into the support sector of the CAP would make olive oil the most heavily subsidized crop in the Community, together with cereals and dairy products.​[64]​ 




The fear to restructure EEC institutions always remained present during the negotiations of Spain and the EEC. Adjusting the CAP to incorporate Spain’s predominantly agrarian economy placed the financial burden of enlargement on the wealthier northern member states and their heavily subsidized agricultural industries.​[71]​ In addition the EEC’s agreements with Mediterranean Non-Member Countries would have to be revised after Spain’s accession. Subsequently, the olive oil market would have to be regulated in a strict manner to avoid a scenario in which Spain’s production would overthrow the European market. No wonder the EEC firmly defended the Community’s interests from the start till finish of the negotiations. The European Commission kept stressing that this possible enlargement should by no means split the cohesion of the Community​[72]​, nor should the enlargement mean a standstill in Community activity.​[73]​ The Community therefore conducted the negotiations on a bilateral basis – as they had done in previous enlargements, to at least appear to conduct the negotiations as one entity. 


1.2.3.1  Institutional format 

To the Community and their desired protection of the Community’s CAP, two basic matters were at hand during the negotiations: 
‘controlling production capacity in the sectors where surpluses are likely to be created or increased; rechanneling production towards sectors where the Community deficit with outside countries is likely to widen.’​[74]​ 
During the negotiating phase various European institutions were very busy trying to incorporate Spain’s agriculture industry into the Community’s CAP.​[75]​ However, the institutional structure of the CAP did not offer much room for flexible positions on the CAP. A Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA) was installed to prepare the work for the CAP during the negotiations, and consisted of civil servants from the member states and operated separately from their comparable institution for Foreign Ministers, COREPER.  Main issues in agriculture were thus taking away for the main arena of negotiations, and suggestions for CAP negotiations were therefore dominated by ‘experts’. The responsible ministers, CAM, were mostly uninvolved in the decision making process and only were notified once an agreement had been reached.​[76]​ Furthermore, lobby groups had the opportunity to interfere direct in the decision making process through a special division that had been set up to channel relations with non-governmental organizations. The result was a conflicting situation, in which an EEC institution operated on an intergovernmental basis for bilateral negotiations. The interests of the member states were first explored before the weight of Spain’s accession would be analyzed. 
The ‘bilateral format’ ensured that the Community would first try to achieve a Common position during an internal congregation, before presenting their Common position to Spain. Basically this format meant that the Community’s position was very inflexible during negotiations.​[77]​ Any further options that Spain wished to discuss meant another round of negotiating the Common position with the ten member states behind closed doors. As none of the member states wished to renegotiate after finally achieving common ground, Spain would often be met with a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude.​[78]​ Although Spain understood early on that accession meant adjusting to the Community’s wishes​[79]​, this did not mean that the outcome of such negotiations was any less hurtful to Spain’s pride;
‘But instead of representing a solution, this attempt to break the ‘monopoly’ of the CAM over agricultural issues failed because of a new French demand for a surveillance mechanism for all products coming from Spain, instead of only for ‘sensitive’ ones as previously agreed. The debacle was such that it left the Community with nothing to present to the Spanish and Portuguese negotiators at the 25th ministerial meeting of 3 October 1984. After several postponements and hours of waiting, only two EC Foreign ministers showed up to talk to Spanish Foreign minister Fernando Morán, who protested formally and cancelled the meeting.’​[80]​
	Spain certainly pulled the shortest straw here. Spain had to wait at the sidelines as the member states were negotiating the terms of accession.​[81]​ As demonstrated in the episode in 1984, Spain had fallen victim to the asymmetric division of power in the negotiations with the EEC.​[82]​ Spain was not presented with an opportunity to add some of the Spanish requests to the list of discussed chapters – the Community was unsuccessful in chasing the long-term benefits, and kept fighting the short-term potential costs. Moreover, the EEC continually adjusted the terms of entry as a standstill in Community activity had been vowed to be avoided at all costs. Consequently the CAP turned into a moving target, presenting Spain with a new set of requirements for the CAP at each meeting.​[83]​ Unfortunately for Spain, they had to accept this bilateral format – after all, they were the party that had applied for membership, the EEC had not asked Spain to join. Furthermore, Spain was one of the poorest democracies in the new EEC composition, whom in a sense desperately needed the EEC for further development.​[84]​ That combined with Spain’s infantile democratic state did not leave Spain with any leverage to turn the negotiations in their favour. 

1.2.3.2  Conflicting Economic Interests

Olive oil certainly was the most discussed crop concerning the implementation of the CAP in Spain;  
‘In sum, the Community needed to take into account a great number of conflicting factors in its plans to reform the olive oil regime: the social importance of the sector; other non-EEC Mediterranean countries (Tunisia and Morocco); the costs; the effects of restrictions (tax) on other vegetable oil producers, EC consumers and the oil processing industry; […] the demands of dairy farmers for a tax; and calls to reform the sector and use regional/ structural instead of guarantee funds. In this context, it is not surprising that this was on of the most contentious issues in the accession negotiations with Spain, triggering as it did an internal EC debate with multiple ramifications. Olive oil producing countries (Greece and Italy) refused any reduction in the protection levels to the sector, while the United States and those countries with an interest in margarine and oil seeds like the Netherlands refused the tax proposed by the Commission.’​[85]​ 
The Northern member states would have to pay the price of the accession that much was clear. However the competition for Spain would come from the south – France and Italy.​[86]​ Sectoral interests were already deemed of more importance than the enlargement itself. Moreover, the CAP continued to be a moving target.​[87]​ Yet continually changing the CAP in favor of the current member states of the EEC would not solve the question of olive oil. In order to protect the EEC’s domestic markets, the member states insisted upon controlling the surpluses by financially supporting Spanish farmers to change their production of certain crops, preferably to crops that the EEC experienced a shortage of.​[88]​ Especially the farmers that had improved their production efficiency with the help of irrigation plants would have to be persuaded to change their production.​[89]​ 
Nonetheless, not only the French and Italian farmers fall victim to the adjusted production percentages. The MNMC’s would suffer from the enlargement a well. The Mediterranean partners had already expressed concern for their role in the EEC’s CAP after the enlargement. During the negotiations with Spain, the Community tried to reassure their Mediterranean partners though the realization of a new version of the 1972 Mediterranean policy. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations with Spain would be, the Mediterranean policy could only survive depending on ‘[…] the Community’s participation in measures designed to reduce the difficulties: the reconversion of production, winning of alternative markets, encouragement of domestic consumption.’​[90]​  In order to prolong the trade relations with the MNMC’s, the Community proposed a set of measures; including the installment of market restrictions. These ‘import ceilings’ would keep the agricultural market of the MNMC’s vital. Each sector would be assessed individually by comparing the level of exports to the EEC in the previous five years. Depending on the outcome of the assessment a maximum of exports would be determined for the MNMC’s.​[91]​ 
	However, the olive oil market once again was the thorny issue in negotiations, even with the MNMC’s. Of all the MNMC’s Tunisia’s agricultural industry resembled Spain’s the most. The production of olive oil was vital for the Tunisian market, and any restrictions would risk the collapse of the Tunisian agricultural industry. The Community decided to not include Tunisia in the endorsement of production ceilings, but financially assist Tunisia in adjusting the agricultural industry. Next to that, Tunisia would have a guarantee of purchase of olive oil from the EEC, to protect the fragile Tunisian market.​[92]​  Still, conversion of the markets not only applied to Tunisia. The Community was willing to financially assist the other MNMC’s in their conversion as well, to prevent the build-up of structural surpluses – which was inevitable without conversion to other industries.​[93]​ Thus the Mediterranean policy aimed more at providing assistance for food strategies as opposed to simply importing goods​[94]​, and therefore the Community proposed an intensification of the multilateral cooperation, to merge the industries of the MNMC’s.​[95]​ Spain as the acceding country was willing to take its responsibility to the Mediterranean, and to pay the price to converse the Mediterranean market.​[96]​
 Nevertheless the accession of Spain wouldn’t affect the EEC’s position in the world in merely a negative way. Although the accession would certainly have some negative effects for the Mediterranean countries, ties with other parts of the world would be improved because of the historic relationship with Spain. Especially Latin-America would be a new market for the EEC’s goods.​[97]​ Nonetheless at the end of day the Northern member states would be the ones left with the bill of enlargement, which triggered a considerable amount of protest from these member states. Especially the French government was fierce in its opposition to the enlargement of the EEC with Spain. Several factors contributed to the thorny relationship of Spain and France, but all came down to one decisive element: France was not willing to sacrifice its own Mediterranean agricultural production in favor of Spanish accession.​[98]​ Pressured by several farming lobby groups and political parties in parliament, the French government had no choice but to defend their national and thus sectoral interests before accepting the greater good – accession of Spain. However, after the installment of a Socialist government in France, relations with Socialist president Gonzáles of Spain were restored​[99]​, and in the end France gave in or the whole accession would have been jeopardized. As soon as the member states were ready to accept the consequences of enlargement, the solutions to the problems of the CAP turned out to be quite straightforward. 




Considering the CAP, negotiations certainly progressed in a complicated manner. The Community had to consider many factors during negotiations, such as the protection of the national market, its relations with the Mediterranean neighbours and of course protecting the internal cohesion. The chosen strategy – postponing final decisions until the other party had no choice but to accept had worked before, and it worked again for Spain.​[102]​ Spain on the other hand had an easier role to play – they had the most to gain from accession and couldn’t wait to join. Therefore they were willing and able to make more concessions, as at the same time the Community dominated the negotiations and their outcome. The Community did not want Spain to join too soon as they first wanted to adjust the CAP to their wishes, and later on admit Spain. What the Community failed to see, was that Spain would probably renegotiate its positions once they were a part of the EEC – what Spain afterwards indeed did.​[103]​ Revision of the relations in that sense did not occur until after accession, when Spain finally had some leverage in the negotiations.​[104]​ 

















1.3  Free Movement of Workers


The CAP may have been the central denominator in the relationship of the EEC and Spain in the course of the accession negotiations; it certainly wasn’t the only hurdle the negotiating partners had to overcome. Intertwined as it was with the negotiations of the CAP, the chapter in the legal framework of the EEC, the ‘Aqcuis Communautaire’, on the “Free Movement of Workers” presented the Member States with a problem. In times of the economic recession that had hit Europe in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973​[105]​, allowing the Spanish workers immediate access to the European Market indeed didn’t present the Community of Nine with an appealing picture. The unemployment percentage was already steadily increasing in the 1970ies in the Community, reaching a staggering figure of 6 million people by the end of 1978.​[106]​ Impelled by these numbers most industrialized nations in the Community had already put a halt to immigration.​[107]​ However, at the time Spain (and Portugal) accounted for a large sum of the immigrants into the Community.​[108]​ Opening the gates to ‘unlimited migration’ after accession could potentially jeopardize the employment position of the indigenous population in the member states. 
Before the effects of the economic recession had become apparent, the migration policies in the Community had been quite liberal. Europe was still in the middle of the economic boom that had gathered ground in the 1950ies, and required an ever growing number of workers to keep up with the consumers’ demands. Spain and Portugal yielded 5,5% of their population to the benefit of the EEC.​[109]​ Member States would stimulate the influx of migrant workers, not paying attention to the potential social repercussions for both the migrants and the native inhabitants once the services of the migrants were no longer required.​[110]​ Shortly after the economic boom had been brought to an abrupt halt, the EEC no longer sought after these migrant workers.  Although the migrants had made an important contribution to the economic prosperity​[111]​, which continued to exist even after the standstill in economic growth, the EEC did not wish to be part of a state of affairs that would increase the number of migrant workers. 

1.3.1 Problems and expectations Spain

Spain had the most to gain from accession; the economic recession was not only visible within the borders of the EEC. Around the time of the enlargement Spain was dealing with an estimated number of 900.000 unemployed labourers​[112]​, and the numbers showed no sign of declining for the near future. What further complicated matters was that most of the rural labourers had only been trained in the agricultural field, and lacked the skills for higher industries. The level of education in Spain at the beginning of the 70ies did not compare to the high standards that had been developed in the northern member states of the EEC. Although Spain had recently opened its doors in favour of westernization, at the start of the 1970ies Spain was still characterized by small and medium sized firms in a mainly domestic economy, which remained highly dependent on foreign technology in order to survive.​[113]​ Spain indeed needed the EEC to invest in raising the national level of education, to compete with the world economy, certainly in a time of crisis. Even more so, Spain needed the means to re-educate the rural labourers to support the up and coming Spanish economy, and prevent further reposition of labour to foreign markets. 
These labourers were better known as the ‘migrant workers’ in the EEC, and Spain was a high contributor to the number of workers abroad. Traditionally the Spanish migrant workers came from the rural areas, such as the south of Spain.​[114]​ Faced with low wages and an increasing gap between the wages in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector – not in favour of agriculture - and tentative job prospects, the agrarian sector started to lose its appeal for the Spaniards.​[115]​ As a result, Spaniards started to move to other areas, sometimes abroad, looking for a more secure job environment. This had already led to a certain ‘drain’ of rural workers within Spain itself, spiralling down from nearly five million workers in 1940 to just below three million workers at the end of 1970.​[116]​ Consequently Spain’s countryside no longer divided itself along small villages all around the country, but changed into a population with heavy concentrations in urban areas – where the demand for manpower was high. This resulted in a very unequal distribution of Spain’s population indeed.​[117]​ 
Thus the Spanish government not only wanted to keep their labour force closer to home, the government also sought to distribute the population in a more equivalent manner. The manpower was needed in the urban areas; however it was the side-effects that displeased the Spanish government. Regional disparities in terms of development and prosperity started to increase in Spain. The newly urbanized areas spurted forwards, as the expansion possibilities in the Spanish industrial areas were immense.​[118]​ However, the less-developed regions were left with the consequences. The insufficient levels of investment which created low technological advancement in these areas faced them with a downward spiral; nobody would be interested in investing in these ‘underdeveloped’ areas.​[119]​ Spain had to re-invent itself, converse its economy to a less dependent status on foreign markets. In order to achieve this, the ‘human’ limits – such as the scarcity of training and skills – had to be addressed.​[120]​ The accession would give Spain access to the European Regional Development Fund, and a number of other subsidiaries so as to decrease the regional differences and converse its economy. Furthermore, Spain needed the means to present Spain and not the wealthier member states as a viable and attractive market for workers again. Spain indeed had a lot to gain from an enlargement of the EEC in the 1970ies.  


1.3.2 Problems and expectations EEC


In a sense, the problems of Spain were quite similar to those of the EEC. The economic crisis had left the EEC with an enormous social problem, facing over 6 million unemployed, remarkable regional disparities and a workforce that consisted of a mix of domestic and migrant workers.​[121]​ Until then the EEC had welcomed the migrant labourers with open arms, but after the crisis hit these migrants were deemed unnecessary. All this at a time two of the highest contributors to the migrant labour force applied for membership – the EEC surely was hesitant about opening its doors. The domestic market resumed its priority position on the EEC agenda, thus in effect affecting the negotiations with Spain. To a great extent, the industrial and social structures of Spain were dissimilar to those of the EEC, and accession of Spain would increase the number of regions and sectors in trouble in the Community of Nine.​[122]​ The EEC could perhaps reap the benefits of accession at a later stage, but in the short-term the costs of accession would have to be covered by the EEC, whom was fully aware of this allotment. 
The unemployment numbers in the EEC and Spain had reached a new high. The constraints that accession would put on the already overstretched labour market made the EEC hesitant about implementing the FMOW straight after accession. The redundancy circumstances called for a new EEC strategy where economic and social policies would have to be coordinated at Community level. This would have to be done to prevent any potential disparities between rates of employment in different regions that could arise when member states individually drafted action plans.​[123]​ The crisis had made a restructuring of the industrial sector necessary, but at the same time also further stimulated the urbanization process in the Community.​[124]​ Migration to wealthier regions was bound to increase in such a scenario, where people would move to the regions with the highest rate of employment.  Spain might have a great potential growth rate; until that potential was reached migrant workers would continue to look for satisfactory wages.  
With the arrival of migrant workers the EEC not only inherited their diverse cultural backgrounds. Social tensions due to this diversity in society transpired to be a problem for the future. At the beginning of the 1970ies migrants had been regarded as a ‘temporary’ fact of life, however, as time passed by more and more of these migrants started to settle down in the EEC. Yet the EEC no longer required the extra manpower that these migrants brought – the demand for them had ceased with the economic crisis. All that was left were the non-qualified activities which were unacceptable for the domestic market.​[125]​ The priority at the time was to satisfy the Community nationals in their job demands before there would be any room for the migrants – whom already were living in the EEC, not to mention new migrants. The internal cohesion of the EEC was the most important factor to be taken into consideration to allow new migrants. The Community was dealing with the imminent arrival of a young work force which was expected to aggravate the problem of unemployment.​[126]​ The result was the failure and unwillingness of (both) the host countries (and the migrants) to successfully integrate these new families into the economic and social life of the member states, having the potential to escalate into tensions and discrimination.​[127]​   




The negotiations about the FMOW didn’t resemble the heated arguments around the CAP, but that doesn’t imply that these negotiations proceeded very smoothly. The EEC was dealing with over 6 million migrant workers, accounting for over a quarter of the workers on the EEC market. Most of them – 73% - came from Third Countries.​[130]​ The influx of migrant workers might have alarmed the member states; none of them was as alarmed as Luxembourg. None of the traditional host countries dealt with the same high migrant percentages as Luxembourg. At the peak of the migration of workers, September 1973, the rate of participation of all migrant labourers in employment in Luxembourg was 36,3%. This was higher than the EEC average of 26,8%​[131]​, and certainly made a stark contrast to the 4,5% of the Netherlands. Luxembourg feared a new massive influx on the domestic labour market of migrants after the FMOW was implemented.​[132]​ In their own interest, the EEC put their foot down on immediate realization of the FMOW. 
Migration is caused by external and internal factors, which in the case of the Spanish migrants primarily were the regional disparities in Spain. The solution to diminish the regional differences came in the appearance of the European Structural Funds - European Regional Policy, and in 1986 with the introduction of the Single European Act. Even before Spain’s application for membership, the EEC realized that regional development inequalities would affect the prosperity levels within the EEC. In 1972 the heads of state concluded that the regional policy would be ‘an essential factor in strengthening the Community.’​[133]​ In the case of Spain, the European Regional Development Fund (1975) would be best suited to eradicate the principal disparities.  The European Regional Development Fund had been set up in 1975, 
‘[...] with the objectives of correcting regional imbalances due to predominance of agriculture, industrial change and structural unemployment. In that period the ERDF could finance three actions, eligible for up to 50% of public expenditure, preferably to be carried out in national state aid areas: investments in small enterprises creating at least 10 new jobs; investments in infrastructure related to point 1, and infrastructure investments in mountainous areas, which had to be eligible under the agriculture guidance fund, too.’​[134]​
Spain was given a chance to tackle the regional disparities prior to the accession through the ERDF, and thus try to take away some of the economic motives for migration through external help. 
As with regard to opening the borders of the EEC to Spanish migrant workers, transitional arrangements turned out to be the solution – as had been with the CAP. Agreed was upon a construction in which the FMOW would be implemented seven years after the accession of Spain​[135]​, including regulations that if the migration movements turned out to be manageable, the time for the transition period could be reduced.​[136]​ Luxembourg had insisted on the long transition time, afraid as it was of the migration potential of Spain. In the end, the migration of Spanish citizens to the EEC turned out to be less substantial as had been expected during the negotiations. As the markets for free movement was liberalized a small ‘wave’ of migrants moved to the western member states​[137]​, which was not unexpected, however all in all labour mobility was higher in the 1960’ies than it was after the accession of Spain.​[138]​  The accession of Spain to the EEC had increased the capital inflows​[139]​, stimulating growth in several regions in Spain. Furthermore, the prospect of a fast growing Spanish economy stimulated potential migrants to reconsider their plans and stay in Spain​[140]​, where perhaps they would have better prospects for prosperity than staring all over in a new country with a different language and different customs.



















Significant during the negotiations for Spain’s accession to the EEC is how little choice Spain had but to accept any offer that was at the table. Especially during the negotiations on the CAP did Spain have to wait for the EEC to present a common position, before negotiations could proceed. The bilateral format overruled the economic interests of Spanish accession for the EEC, consequently dragging the negotiations on for a substantially longer time than had been necessary. If the EEC had been able to unite itself earlier and without the constant nagging of particular member states the CAP chapter could have been concluded a few years earlier. There was not much Spain could do to speed up the negotiations either, as Spain did meet the requirements that had been set by the EEC. The FMOW in this respect was potentially more difficult for the Spanish government to align itself with the European Acquis; nonetheless the focus was on the impact on the European agricultural sector. Migration had been happening for quite some time at the opening of the negotiations and therefore wasn’t a new phenomena. The Spanish agricultural industry however was potentially much more threatening as is remained unclear to what extent the EEC would be able to cover possible financial assistance for the EEC farmers. 





























                   Turkey – prospects for the CAP and the FMOW


2.1 General information and history

‘A Turkey that has completed its grand social project and is a focus of democratic power in the 21st Century offers a priceless opportunity for the establishment of regional and international peace and stability, as well as a singular source of inspiration for those who, in our turbulent region and beyond, seek progress. The achievement of Turkey’s project of integration with the European Union is a historical turning point in respect of carrying out the goal of Alliance of Civilizations, proving the universality of European Union’s values and securing the international peace and stability.’​[147]​
Turkey’s accession is indisputably one of the most complicated enlargements in the history of the EU. Progression in the accession negotiations have been sincerely lacking after the commencement of these talks in 2005. Throughout European history there are traces of interaction between Europe and the Turks. As early as the days of the Ottoman Empire (1301-1922)​[148]​did they share key historical moments, such as the Concert of Europe in the 1850’ies.​[149]​ At its height, the Ottoman Empire stretched well into what we now classify as ‘Europe’. It occupied the Balkans, even a part of Spain​[150]​, and the Ottomans were an important player in the European ‘balance of power’-game.​[151]​  Nonetheless, the First World War caused the once great empire to implode, who had already been suffering from its expansion drive for some time. The remnants were divided amongst the victors of the war (notably France and Great Britain) in the Treaty of Sèvres.​[152]​ 
The Turkey that we know today came into being in 1923, when the Republic of Turkey was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk tried to free Turkey from European domination and dependence.​[153]​ Atatürk reshaped the face of Turkey, by modelling Turkey’s institutional structure on the European conquerors, albeit never having to be a pawn of the European powers again. He tried to stabilize Turkey, through ‘Turkification’ and kemalism. Kemalism implied that the interests of the people as a whole always prevailed over the interests of smaller groups (thereby abolishing a multi-ethnic society). Furthermore kemalism implied that instead of religion as the focus of politics, the state should be governed in a secular manner.​[154]​ Modernization of Turkey was a top priority for Atatürk through creating a uniform Turkish identity, ‘[...] based on the Western model included the introduction of the Latin alphabet and the Gregorian calendar, the “purification” of the language by the purging of Arabic and Persian influences, and the introduction of rules favouring Western-style dress.’ ​[155]​ Westernization of Turkey continued even after his death in 1938, with the first parliamentary democratic elections in 1945. This was continued despite the several coup d’états of the Turkish military, whom regard themselves as safe keepers of Atatürk’s legacy and should protect the preservation of kemalism.​[156]​ 

2.1.1 Overview of the relationship of Turkey and Europe 

The efforts of westernization and modernization did not go unnoticed by Europe. It was as early as 1963 – just little over a decade of European cooperation​[157]​ – that the Turkish government signed an Association Agreement with the heads of states of the EEC. The so-called ‘Ankara Agreement’ was aimed at improving the living standards in Turkey and the EEC countries through lifting the tariffs and barriers in agreed stages to stimulate economic cooperation and trade between Turkey and the EEC. Subsequently the agreement included the first steps for the (eventual) instalment of the Customs Union and specifically entailed a promise for eventual Turkish accession.​[158]​ Three years later, an Additional Protocol was signed, in which the stages towards creating this Customs Union were set out in detail.​[159]​ Until this day, the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol constitute the legal framework of the relationship of the EU and Turkey.​[160]​ There was no doubt about Turkey’s future position in Europe, as the Commissioner Walter Hallstein specifically stated that ‘Turkey is a part of Europe’.​[161]​ To the Turkish government becoming a member state had been understood as a necessity to consolidate the westernization and modernization process, it even became an integral part of the official state ideology.​[162]​ The Turkish drive to enter the EEC as a fully acknowledged member state seemed unstoppable. 
The Turkish optimism for membership of the European club was tempered after Turkey’s formal application for full membership in 1987. Turkey had a legal right to do so as article 237 of the EEC Treaty allows any European state to apply.​[163]​ Yet the European Commission denied Turkey full membership prospective at the time. In retrospect, the EEC’s refusal is easily explained – Turkey simply didn’t meet the standards that were set for any new candidate state. The European Commission’s opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession did stress that excellent progress had been made in economic and social developments, but it also stated that the gap between the EC’s and Turkey’s level of development remained too large to overcome within the next few years.​[164]​ Next to that, the EEC was on the eve of introducing the Single Market for the existing member states. Due to the introduction the European Commission recommended to first implement these changes in the EEC, before the Commission would be able to review the possible Turkish addition to the EEC.​[165]​ Moreover, Turkey still couldn’t be called a ‘democracy’, as minority rights were marginalized (to say the least) and interference by the military in politics still was more of regularity than a rarity.  Although this came as a slight blow to the Turkish government, Turkey remained hopeful of a positive outcome. 
The rejection of the membership  application did not slow down the negotiations regarding the Customs Union. The talks were finalized in March 1995, and came into effect at the start of 1996. The Agreement envisaged a harmonization of Turkish policies to EEC policies in virtually every field relating to the internal market, and thus not confining itself to a simple abolition of tariff and quantative barriers for trade between the two parties.​[166]​ This relationship was and will remain unique in the history of the EU, as it is not only the first extensive functioning customs union with a third state, it also is the closest relationship that the EU has had with any non-member country in terms of economic and political ties.​[167]​ The Customs Union resulted in the EU becoming Turkey’s largest trading partner, and Turkey ranking 7th on the EU’s list of trading partners.​[168]​ Future prospects for further deepening of this trade relationship were hopeful, as Turkey is supposed to achieve the status of one of the top ten economies in the world​[169]​, and thus pose a promising market for the EU. 
In the wake of the successful implementation of the Customs Union, the EU and Turkey both were trying to expand their borders. However, there seemed to be different perspectives on how to accomplish the expansion. Turkey, holding on to the promise of 1963, was now looking for a consolidation of their status within the EU through full membership. The EU on the other hand was reluctant to grant this position. In a series of successive EU summits during the course of the late 1990’ies European Commission decided to ignore Turkey’s claim. The EU enlargement strategy ‘Agenda 2000’ in 1997 showed that the EU chose an enlargement policy with no intention to include Turkey any time soon.​[170]​ Although acknowledging Turkey’s ability to successfully adapt to EU policies, the EU remained strong on their position to only include ‘true’ democracies, which was still a problem with regards to Turkey. Turkey was in the middle of a war against the separatist organisation PKK in the southeast of the country, applying highly questionable tactics. It also remained a fervent supporter of a Northern Cyprus Turkish state, and thus blocking any cooperation from the member state Greece. It would certainly be difficult to move forward for both parties.  

2.1.2	The build-up to the opening of the accession negotiations

It wasn’t until the Helsinki summit of 1999 that the EU acknowledged Turkey’s claims for accession for the first time. Due to a number of positive factors – PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had been arrested therefore putting a temporary halt to the conflict in the southeast, and Greece had decided to no longer oppose Turkish accession due to positive developments in Cyprus – the door was opened for Turkey. In addition the EU had realised that by declaring Turkey a candidate state, the Turkish government would benefit from EU subsidies and pre-accession strategies and would be more likely to put reforms on top of the Turkish political agenda.​[171]​ Initially it appeared that the EU had been right in thinking so. No less than a record number of 34 amendments were made to the Turkish constitution to bring Turkish laws and regulations more in line with the European Aqcuis Communautaire. This included the abolishment of the death penalty (which ironically worked in favour of Öcalan as his death penalty was changed into a lifelong imprisonment), and granting minorities more rights (in theory rather than in practice).​[172]​ The EU was the first to applaud Turkey for its changes, but remained vague in giving a starting date for the membership negotiations. The late nineties and the beginning of the new millennium marked the accession of a large number of central and eastern European states, whom gave the EU a lot to handle in policy terms in the years leading up to this accession round. Nevertheless the EU continued to assist Turkey on the road to candidate member state status. 
This positive change of Turkey’s willingness to reform had begun in the late nineties. It surprisingly started with one of the weakest coalitions in Turkish political history​[173]​, but only seriously started to gather ground after the landslide victory of the AKP (Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or the Justice and Development Party) in 2002. Though the AKP represents a pro-Islamic political ideology, and thus embodies exactly that what Atatürk abolished in political life, they have managed to successfully adapt Atatürks western vision of Turkey.​[174]​ The AKP has made accession to the EU one of their key policies in the years after the elections in 2002. This new government implemented a new round of reforms in Turkish political life, which eventually were acknowledged by the EU whom seriously appreciated these modifications. Thus this ‘good behaviour’ on Turkey’s side did not go unrewarded – the EU finally gave in and in December 2004 promised to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.​[175]​ AKP had finally achieved what can be regarded as Atatürk’s ultimate goal – acknowledgement of the western character of Turkey. Ironically it was the pro-Islamic AKP succeeded in fulfilling his wish, as Atatürk would have despised the Islamic roots of the AKP. This didn’t stop the Turks from supporting their new government – local elections in 2004 only amplified the mandate of the AKP and their political reforms, as well as the AKP’s quest for Europe.​[176]​     
The enthusiasm of the Turks may not be met with the same enthusiasm by the Europeans. Although the AKP started of with a reform race, after the opening of negotiations in 2005 there has been an abrupt halt in the reform drive of the AKP.​[177]​ Modifying the constitution on 34 amendments certainly is a first positive step, but for Turkey to truly adopt the required European aqcuis, a new Turkish constitution is needed.  That shouldn’t be too difficult considering the AKP is the largest party in parliament and thus has the mandate to do so​[178]​, but so far there has been no conformity within the Turkish parliament on a new constitution.  Equally there has been a standstill in European initiatives for accession of Turkey. Public opinion has started to interfere with European and national policy making, thus making the accession of Turkey – a Republic with a demographic Islamic majority – more difficult as time proceeds.​[179]​ The Turks continue to regard this accession as essential; its relationship with the EU remains the dominant partnership in its international relations. ​[180]​ Spain’s accession has been discussed previously, is there a possibility that Turkey can learn from the Spanish case?










2.2	Common Agricultural Policy 


2.2.1  An Overview


‘The agricultural sector is of crucial importance as Pan-Euro-Mediterranean regional integration will not be achieved without significant repercussions for the Common Agricultural Policy.’​[181]​
For a comparison of the accession process of Turkey and Spain it is necessary to analyze the CAP in Turkey’s case as well. Although Turkey’s economy does not rely on Agriculture as heavily as Spain’s did in the 1980ies – Industrial production (including energy) and Tourism are the biggest industries in Turkey​[182]​  - agriculture remains an important industry for Turkey. Agriculture remains one of the main occupations of the Turks, accountable for about 34% of the Turkish labour force.​[183]​ Currently Turkey’s produced crops are present to a significant degree on the EU market, even in regards to the ‘sensitive products’, such as tobacco, cotton, olives and olive oil, sugar, beef, dairy, fruit, vegetables. The expectancy is that the effect of Turkey’s entry will be small in terms of competition on the EU market​[184]​, though hurdles in incorporating Turkey fully into the EU’s CAP do remain. The share of the agricultural sector in Turkey’s GPD is already rapidly decreasing.​[185]​ Nevertheless upon Turkey’s entry the EU will be faced with a large Turkish labour force trained in nothing but agricultural production. 
Before the negotiations commenced, Turkey enjoyed a rather privileged status in its cooperation with the EU. The Customs Union of 1995 established a relationship that the EU had never instituted with a third state before.  In order to put the Customs Union into practice Turkey had to adopt certain elements of the European acquis. These included some regulatory and legal changes for the Turkish agricultural sector at the time. The Customs Union abolished all quantative restrictions in reasonable situations on import and export flows from Turkey to the EU and vice-versa.​[186]​ Even more, Turkey concluded preferential trade agreements with the same countries as the EU to join and affirm the ever closer relationship of the EU and Turkey in hope of future accession. Decision 1/98 of the Customs Union specifically goes into the agricultural production and goods, affirming the preferential trade status of Turkey to the EU.​[187]​  
However, in light of the impending accession the Customs Union can’t be conclusive. Problems and expectations with regards to the CAP remain with both negotiating parties. The EU is frequently experiencing budgetary problems with the CAP, and any possible restrictions for the CAP budget could require imposing stricter rules for the acceding countries.​[188]​ Other factors that would have to be considered consist of the negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda, Doha for the Qatar city in which the negotiations in 2001 were launched. These negotiations aimed to take the agreements and the institution of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into the new millennium, as a start of a new era. Any agreements reached there will have implications for the EU legislation, and therefore for acceding countries as well.​[189]​ The EU will have to impose a new round of negotiating the CAP, which will be problematic if it coincided with accession negotiations.  Next to that, there will be more pressure on the EU market for agricultural products, due to preferential market access arrangements with third countries, which will further increase the need for policy reforms.​[190]​  
On the Turkish side awaits the present and out of date agricultural policy (which is in the middle of reforms). The Turkish MARA (Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs) is responsible for the Agricultural policy, but until the accession negotiations were in the picture not much had been reformed in the traditional system. It wasn’t until 2001 that ‘[...] the Government of Turkey has embarked on a structural adjustment and stabilization program of historic dimensions’​[191]​ in order to align its agriculture more to the EU laws and regulations, the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project – ARIP. The Turkish system had been heavily influenced by the government through subsidies and artificial incentives, and ARIP seeks to change this approach into a market driven one instead. The market demand as a basis for production would in turn force the agricultural producers to enhance their efficiency and subsequently compel the farmers use their land as effective as possible.​[192]​  Subsidies would still be available for the farmers through a system of Direct Income Support (DIS). However, instead of providing income to the farmers the DIS would be used as an incentive to reform the farming structure. Thus, the subsidies may be reduced by the time Turkey accedes; the EU will still have to debate the remaining large amount of subsidies.      
Nonetheless, the biggest problem for both parties is the current standstill in the accession negotiations. Much can be said and done to analyze the enlargement and its implications for Turkey and the EU’s CAP, but there is no expectancy that there will be significant progress in the near future. The biggest complication is that the Agricultural chapter is one of the eight chapters that have been suspended over the debacle with Cyprus.​[193]​ 

2.2.2 Problems and expectations Turkey

The regional inequality gap is one of the most pressing and persisting problems that Turkey has to face before accession to the EU could take place. Naturally several causes can be identified; however, agriculture and agricultural production play quite a hefty role in this problem.​[194]​ As the east of Turkey depends on agriculture for its local economy more than the west does, so does the ‘poor’/rich line divide Turkey. The poorer regions in the east have a much larger number of people employed in agriculture than does the west.​[195]​ Remarkable is the female participation rate in the east in agriculture – more women than men are employed in the agricultural sector. An explanation could be the (traditional) high level of unpaid family labour that mostly concerns the female members of the family.​[196]​ Seeing that Turkish society is still in the midst of ‘modernizing’, it is no wonder that the usually patriarchal social fabric of society for now remains embedded.​[197]​ Regional differences thus relate to more than just a matter of allocation of funds, it also involves traditional roles in society that need to be addressed. Before accession Turkey will need significant funding to tackle the financial issues as well as providing guidance in altering the patriarchal society. These development funds will have to be focused on the rural areas where the differences in wealth and society remain most prominent.​[198]​ 
Another issue that Turkey needs to address is the farming system itself. Although problems are only expected in the sugar and animal sectors in terms of production​[199]​, the Turkish farms themselves are usually small and spread in a fragmented manner over the rural areas.​[200]​ These minimal production farms are an important characteristic of Turkish agriculture, distinguishable by very low productivity, low competitiveness and high hidden unemployment (family labour).​[201]​ As inefficient as they may be, these types of farms are crucial for providing income security and livelihood for millions of the rural population in Turkey. The accession of Turkey will implicate some big changes for the farming sector in order to be allowed to compete on the European market, which could push the small farms out as they may not be able to meet all the new requirements.​[202]​ Next to that, the retailers will have higher costs when purchasing perishable goods such a fruit from many small farms instead of a few large producers.​[203]​ The already low productivity is furthermore declining even more because of the fragmented land. Instead of cooperating to be able to make use of the large-scale water-resource development – which is unsuitable for small farms – the same small farms continue producing crops as they have before and thus help in the devastation of their productivity.​[204]​ 
Turkey is dealing with inadequate institutions to deal with the implementation of new laws and regulations. So far a large number of regulations and laws have been passed in Turkey to adopt the acquis as quickly as possible. However, there has been insufficient inspection of the actual implementation of these regulations.​[205]​ Combined with the lingering level of bribery, corruption, and discriminatory application of regulations, implementation not only will require effective institutions. There is also a need for a radical change in the mindset of all involved.​[206]​  Simply adopting the acquis does not guarantee improved production or welfare. The institutional framework of the acquis in Turkey is still at an early stage of development. The required formal institutions and formal institutional rules are expected to take a long time to ‘bed in’ in the mindset of the people that have to deal with these new rules, just as the informal rules – people’s expectations of how the rules will work in practice, and acceptance of the true antisocial nature of corrupt practices. Successful institutionalization of society and bureaucrats will remain a problem in Turkey for a while. 
And with the issues surrounding institutions discussion do we touch upon another delicate matter – the influence of the Turkish government on the agricultural economic sector. For a long time, the agricultural sector has been used in a sense that it can win votes for the Turkish political parties. Agriculture had not received any serious attention from the government in Turkey –improving the efficiency of the agricultural sector as well as adjusting agricultural production to the present and future needs of the Turkish society has remained untouched until Turkey became a candidate state.​[207]​ Instead the government protected the policy in place prior to accession negotiations by protecting their farmers with direct income support, guaranteeing a certain amount of income to survive. This market intervention would have to be adjusted before accession. The ARIP program –which has been discussed earlier – focuses on smoothing the transition from a heavily government influenced agricultural sector to a more market driven one.​[208]​ However, this is not doable within two years - the budgetary costs of direct income support would – for the time being – have to shift to the EU budget.​[209]​  


2.2.3 Problems and expectations EU

Turkey’s production of typically Mediterranean crops will not scare the European farmers as much as Spain’s did. However, certain products and the market share of the Turkish agricultural production perhaps could. Measured against international standards Turkey certainly is a major agricultural producer, leading in the production of apricots, hazelnuts and figs in the world.​[210]​ Other products – which influenced the Spanish negotiations – are produced at a large scale as well. Although olives and olive oil are quite costly in Turkey itself, the production of these products has rapidly increased since 1980.​[211]​ Even more so, the production of citrus fruits has tripled within the same time period.​[212]​ The EU nevertheless doesn’t have to fear though competition due to low prices for the Turkish products – in 2000, Turkey’s prices for apples, oranges and lemons were well above the price level of Spain and Greece. Furthermore, some of the large industries in Turkey – including tobacco, wheat’s and dairy – currently don’t have the potential to exceed European production. The EU should rather discuss the burden of the farmers’ financial protection by the Turkish government​[213]​, and the costly implications of accepting Turkey into the EU’s midst.  
The expansion of the EU with Turkey not only implies a bigger agricultural market, it also means a vast expansion of territory. The new borders of the EU will be weaker than they were before, certainly in the south/southeast of Turkey.​[214]​ The EU’s internal market could be threatened by the increased risk of smuggling in goods that are not in compliance with the EU legislation, as well as the increased risk of animal diseases due to the uncontrolled border passing of livestock.  This could negatively affect the attitude of the EU during the negotiations as other enlargement negotiations – including Spain’s and more recently the enlargement of 2004 – showed that the EU will make no concessions on border issues. The EU prides itself on the (mostly) disease free status and will be unwilling to compromise that.​[215]​ To the EU, Turkey will have to step up their game and raise the number of veterinary and plant border inspection points, just as the patrolling of the borders to catch smugglers. This means that relationships with neighbouring states – such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Armenia – should be strong as alienating them would cause more trouble on the borders. Weak borders are a problem in other policy areas as well, including the FMOW, but later more on that.  
Although the expectancy is that Turkey’s accession will only remotely affect the EU’s CAP, certain developments within the EU will have to apply to Turkey as well. The EU is experiencing a trend in the production and trade process, a shift from quantity to quality. Although the food (and agricultural) industry currently is a production focused sector, the demand for qualitative food is increasing on the western European markets. This trend is interconnected with the new focus on quality standards when importing goods rather than simply imposing tariffs.​[216]​ While this trend itself is not necessarily a problem, implementing this trend for Turkey could be. The western European countries are well equipped to produce agricultural products for higher standards, as opposed to Turkey whom still is in the process of changing its agricultural structure. On the whole this means high budgetary costs for the EU as their newly instated member state would have to receive substantial funding to apply this shift in production. And as the budget of the CAP is scrutinized as it is, spending more money wouldn’t sound appealing to the other 27 member states. 
 Speaking of budgetary implications, the consequences of Turkey’s accession on the CAP budget remain uncertain. A lot depends on the future growth rate of Turkey’s economy, which can only be estimated and doesn’t give any guarantees. Adjusting EU policy to incorporate Turkey is difficult as one never knows which of the financial projections will take place.​[217]​ What would be the consequences if the numbers are significantly different to the predicted ones? The EU hadn’t concluded on the budgetary framework yet for 2007-2013 in 2004, which complicates the accession negotiations in such that it is impossible to determine the allocated funding for Turkey. As stated before the Turkish farmers depend on the direct income support received from the Turkish government, which could not be abolished immediately after accession. The EU would have to take the burden of paying the Turkish farmers prior to and after accession.​[218]​ The budgetary debate will largely be determined by the financial strategy that the EU chooses to follow. Will the EU either provide Turkey with the same opportunities enjoyed by other acceding states in financial terms, or would the EU deem the financial burden too heavy for the existing member states and change the distribution of the financial resources?​[219]​
The EU and Turkey are faced with another rather large financial burden – the regional disparities in Turkey, larger than any other enlargement has seen. To a certain extent this has been caused by the dependency on agriculture in the eastern parts of Turkey. The years before 2004 saw a deepening of the regional differences in Turkey instead of a decreasing trend. Even more so, the Turkish GDP per capita upon accession would be lower than that of any other member state in the EU-27.​[220]​ Combined with the relative wide income disparities in Turkey compared to the other EU countries and the remoteness of the country – especially in the eastern regions – make Turkey the ‘perfect’ candidate for receiving large sums of funding. This has implications for other underdeveloped regions who are currently receiving aid from the cohesion funds. The EU will have to reform its structural funds system in order to incorporate all the requiring EU regions.​[221]​ Turkey’s entry could increase the threshold for regions eligible for funding. Lowering the common level of the EU’s GDP implies that several member states would no longer be regarded as ‘poor’.​[222]​ Spain for example would be excluded from the cohesion funds – if the financial projections for the coming years turn out be correct.
One way or another, from an economic perspective the negotiating parties could in potential seriously benefit from each other. Turkey’s agriculture could be stimulated by the influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Businesses are more likely to invest as soon as there is some kind of ‘guarantee’ that stability is coming. Europe would therefore have to hasten the negotiations on the free movement of capital to open the Turkish markets for FDI. Accession to the EU would give Turkey stability in political and economic terms. Combined with (hopefully) more consistency in bureaucratic processes and increased production efficiency the potential of the Turkish market would greatly interest foreign investors.​[223]​ The FDI could take some of the burden from the EU in budgetary terms. Also in the food industry itself FDI would help. The process of getting the agricultural products from the farms to the consumers is still rather basic in Turkey. The FDI could play an important role in financing the restructuring and modernization of the Turkish food industry​[224]​, and in that way improve the consumption rate of the products – getting them to markets in western Europe – as well as raising the profits for the farmers.

2.2.4  Negotiations? 

Negotiations on the CAP have yet to take place, as the negotiations had been suspended so quickly into the accession process. Therefore it’s unfortunately not possible to give an overview of the negotiations and their outcome. Instead there will be a summary of how the problems that Turkey and the EU face with accession could be resolved. Whether the ‘real’ negotiations follow the same pattern is to be seen, nevertheless it could provide some useful insights into the accession process and which issues could/expected to be divided into conflicting economic interests or rather relate to the institutional format of the negotiations/European Union. 

2.2.4.1	 Conflicting Economic Interests 

The FDI could help to a certain extent to lift the budgetary implications for the EU of Turkish accession, with the help of modernized markets.  However, it is the Turkish production that will have to adapt to the European demands. Europe is in the middle of a shift of production to consumer demand, implying higher quality requirements for the products. In that sense, Europe has a clear advantage to the Turkish production, as it is better adapted to provide for these consumer demands. And at the same time, Europe will have unlimited access to the Turkish products, which will be cheaper to import. The European Union will benefit from increased access to Turkish markets rather than losing out to the Turkish competition. In the negotiations it will be a matter of the member states being able to see the advantages as opposed to the costs in order to move past the conflicting economic interests. 
The relative large amount of small Turkish farms needs to be taken into consideration during negotiations. Although it is expected that most of these farms would not survive the accession, it’s also a principle matter. With the help of investment the small farms could have a future in the European market. Investors could be ‘[...] an important instrument for giving farms access to inputs such as knowledge and techniques, and enhancing their output in terms of quality and quantity.’​[225]​ Without investments the small farms would never be able to enjoy the same amount of knowledge in how to improve efficiency as bigger farms, simply because they do not have the time and money to invest in knowledge. Rather than letting these farmers halt production and subsequently drive them into unemployment, small investments could give these farmers and the Turkish agricultural sector another chance of survival. The EU cannot ignore that fragmentation of production for now is a better option than a large supplement of unemployed workers in Turkey. 
Relating to the European shift of quantity to quality is the environmental awareness in Europe. During negotiations Europe will press Turkey to implement environmental friendly measures, as the climate is high on the European agenda. Becoming a member of the EU could help Turkey with controlling adverse effects of agricultural production such as salinization and soil degradation. However, the Turkish government is dealing with a population that has a low evaluation of environmental resources and facilities.​[226]​ And as implementation of environmental friendly measures heavily depends on behavioural habits, Turkey could have big problems with convincing the Turks of the importance of the environment. The Turkish government will experience conflicts while balancing the European agenda and at the same time promoting the wishes of the Turks. 
These benefits sound appealing, but as they are scenarios as opposed to certainties they will remain hard to negotiate. How can the EU have faith in the ‘certain’ influx of FDI? How can Turkey expect to trust in the financial help from the EU and the FDI? It will come down to trust in the negotiation partner and which economic interests are higher up in the agenda of the negotiations. The environment is an economic and a format problem – what is of higher value to accession, economic benefits or a matter of who is right? The negotiations will be determined by the power of the EU to look beyond conflicting economic interest and see the advantages, as the Turkish agricultural market looks promising for the European Market.  

2.2.4.2  Institutional format 

Although there is no obvious distinction between clearly economic or institutional problems for the negotiations as they have yet to begin, Turkey’s problems with inadequate institutions are more something that would come up as a problem with regards to the institutional format.  There is a definite need for a radical change in the mindset of the bureaucrats and citizens in Turkey to successfully adopt the EU regulations with regards to the CAP.​[227]​ How can the EU be convinced of Turkey’s best interests if corruption remains a problem? It is possible that the EU will heavily rely on their combined weight to pressure Turkey into a rapid and fundamental reform of the bureaucratic system. Trust in the other negotiating party is important for the negotiations to succeed. The EU and the European citizens will not want to repeat the too soon accession of Bulgaria and Romania​[228]​, where it turned out that corruption remained at large and the governmental institutions continue to be inadequate for the EU regulations. 
However, the insufficient institutions are not the only governmental problem the EU will have during negotiations. Turkey’s governments have never really seriously reformed the agricultural system nor given serious attention to the agricultural population. Only in light of the impeding accession did the government launch the ARIP program and the follow-up agricultural program for 2006-2010 to reform the sector into a more efficient one. The rules and regulations of the EU cannot all be implemented at the time of accession – how can the EU remain hopeful of Turkey’s efforts to keep reforming the sector? Most likely the EU will (once again) suggest transitional periods of time, to give Turkey ánd the EU time to adjust to the newly expanded market. This implies that Turkey will have to wait before the Common Market is accessible for Turkish products, something the Turks would rather have happen upon accession. In this case the European negotiation format will work to the advantage of the EU – Turkey wishes to accede, not the other way around and will therefore be the one to adjust. 





2.2.5  Summarizing Statements 































2.3 Free Movement of Workers

Together with the CAP the Free Movement of Workers (FMOW) policy chapter was important for the outcome of the Spanish negotiations for accession. It is expected that at east in the FMOW the same can be said for the Turkish government’s negotiations with the EU. Historically there has been a substantial influx of so called ‘guest workers’ into the EU/EEC, for both Spain and Turkey, of whom quite a few persons have settled in western Europe for an indefinite period of time. The fear of mass-migration once the visa-requirements for travelling to the west were abolished sparked social unrest during the Spanish accession negotiations. Almost thirty years later the same fear still resides in the minds of the EU-27 citizens, this time out of fear for mass-migration from the Turks. Negotiations on the FMOW policy chapter have been suspended in light of the Cyprus debacle; nonetheless, the subject dominates the discussion on whether or not Turkey should become the EU’s newest member state. Are these fears realistic, or are they merely a symptom of something deeper, such as other uncertain prospects surrounding the Turkish accession, which lead to an all-together fear of Turkey in the EU? These assumptions are beyond the scope of this research; however, an attempt will be made to demonstrate whether or not the fear of mass-migration is realistic for the Turkish accession.  
At the end of the 1960’ies/beginning of the 1970’ies Europe experienced a high labor demand for low-cost workers, which could not be met with the European supply at the time. As a result, some European countries started to (actively) recruit workers to keep the economy running.​[230]​ Turkish migrant workers represented a large portion of the ‘guest workers’, workers whom were expected to return home after fulfilling their tasks. Between 1963 and 1973 about 730.000 Turks migrated to Europe, of which Germany was the most popular destination.​[231]​ However, after the economic crisis that hit Europe in 1973 the labor demand declined significantly. This put an abrupt end to the labor recruitment in all third countries, including Turkey.​[232]​ Nonetheless, the Turkish ‘guest workers’ did not return to their birth country as expected, but opted to stay in the more prosperous western countries of Europe.  Legal labor migration may have been halted due to the crisis, but these workers had started a new life in Europe and had no intention of returning to their less appealing lives in Turkey. Migratory flows in the following years can be headed under family reunification​[233]​, the families joining their (often) male family members in Europe.
Nowadays, the number of Turkish immigrants in the European Union surpasses three million people, with (still) the largest number of them residing in Germany – just over 75%.​[234]​ Migrant workers and their families from Turkey are an integrated concept in the EU, their numbers constituting the largest group of third-country nationals in the EU – 25% of all third-country nationals in the EU originate from Turkey.​[235]​ Many families have been in the EU for years, now represented by the second or even third generation of immigrants. The EU has tried to accommodate these migrants with the best intentions, by granting them the same rights and privileges as EU citizens.​[236]​ For example, EU regulations have (from the beginning of the immigration flows) secured that Turkish nationals whom have legally lived and worked in an EU member state for four years are free to migrate to other states within the EU.​[237]​ 
However, times have changed and so have the EU regulations. Shortly after the Spanish accession the Schengen Agreement was implemented, and thereby 
‘[...] these states abolished internal border controls between them. In the concept of Schengen, the abolition of internal border controls required accompanying measures such as tight external border controls and a common policy on admission of third-country nationals, including a common via policy. The Schengen Convention approach is exclusively restrictive in that the issue of migration is dealt with in terms of threatening internal security and its links with international crime.’​[238]​
In short, citizens of the participating countries are free to travel within the Schengen borders. Fear of a massive influx of Turkish nationals after accession is prompted by this agreement as well. Astounding media broadcasting suggest through hasty interpretation numbers as high as 25% migrants on a population of 70 million Turks.​[239]​ Fact is, when Turkey accedes the Turks will become de facto European citizens.​[240]​ 
So far, Turkey has made little progress in aligning its FMOW policy with the EU acquis communautaire chapter. In the acquis, the FMOW chapter 
‘[...] provides that EU citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State. EU migrant workers must be treated in the same way as national workers in relation to working conditions, social and tax advantages. This acquis also includes a mechanism to coordinate national social security provisions for insured persons and their family members moving to another Member State.’​[241]​ 
The European Commission screening report of the FMOW is one of the nine reports that are being postponed for publication, reportedly because of some Turkey-skeptic EU member states.​[242]​ Although the accession negotiations threaten to come to an indefinite standstill, what are the expected problems and expectations for the negotiating partners? 

2.3.1  Problems and expectations Turkey


Turkey still has to align a lot of its regulations with the European acquis concerning the FMOW. The migration from Turkey to the EU however hasn’t experienced a standstill in recent years. ‘Typical’ Turkish migrant workers can be identified by certain characteristics: single, male, aged 15-39, unemployed and doesn’t own his /her own property in Turkey.​[243]​ Even more, the Turkish migrant has a stronger rural background. Traditionally this has been the perceived image in Europe, and many of these elements are still important influences for migration nowadays. Especially the younger age determines whether one has the motivation to migrate, as people tend to be more flexible and mobile when they are younger.​[244]​ Yet there are trends undermining this traditional image. For instance, new groups of immigrants are emerging, including females.​[245]​ Next to that, higher education is becoming a positive drive for migration. Although in the case of Turkey this education mostly concerns tertiary degrees, nonetheless the incentive to migrate seems larger after obtaining a degree. The migrants are willing to accept jobs beneath their level of qualification, in order to gain in prosperity.​[246]​ Consequences for Turkey could be large – if Turkey doesn’t improve their job perspectives for the young workers, there could be a brain drain in Turkey in the years after accession.
The future and the prospects of the national labor market could become a big problem for Turkey. The consequent brain drain of inadequate measures would be undesirable for the EU and especially for Turkey, draining the market in Turkey from potential valuable laborers. According to the ‘National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis’ Turkey’s current labor market could be described as  
‘[…] low labour force participation rates and low employment rates, especially among women, the rapid increase in the working-age population, high young unemployment rate, limited capacity of the economy to create employment, high level of informal employment, and inadequate employment growth in spite of high real GDP growth rates due to dissolution in agricultural economy.’​[247]​
Trends suggest that the unemployed are also willing to migrate, and some research propose that 12% of the Turkish unemployed would want to migrate when given the chance.​[248]​ As Turkey is in the middle of reforming the agricultural sector, this has implications for the rural workers – productivity will be increased through technology at the expense of traditional workers.​[249]​ Exactly how many Turks will migrate to the west of Europe will depend significantly on Turkey’s own capacities to converge as soon as possible towards the EU income levels, giving young workers a better outlook on the future, and secondly on how the large agglomerations such as Istanbul can absorb a large portion of the migrant pressure from the rural areas.​[250]​ The absorption level relies on sufficient funding and job creation by the government, taking away motivation to migrate – the cultural and language barriers are higher for international migration than national migration.​[251]​ In other words, the labor market in Turkey should be made attractive and hopeful again, if Turkey doesn’t want to lose a large portion of the young workers to the EU market. 
For a country that is aspiring to be a part of the EU free movement of labor and capital, Turkey not only has to reform their national labor market to meet the labor supply at home, they also need to change their policy towards foreign workers residing in Turkey. The Turkish government has remarkable tight restrictions for granting foreign work permits. Remarkable, because less than 0.1 per cent of the official Turkish workforce is foreign-born, whereas in major economies the number of foreign workers is about 10%.​[252]​ For example, comparing the number of Turkish entrepreneurs allowed to begin their own businesses in Germany to the number of all foreign workers in Turkey shows that the numbers in Germany are three times higher than the numbers in Turkey.​[253]​ If Turkey truly wishes to become a part of the EU ‘open society’, where one can migrate between member states without bureaucratic delays, than the Turkish government should advocate free enterprise by foreigners and encourage the notion of an open society. Failure will lead to the perception in Europe that Turkey itself applies a double standard for administering the same rights and freedoms for foreigners on Turkish soil.​[254]​ Turkey has to improve its policy on foreign workers in order to be granted the same rights for the Turks as the other citizens of the EU.   
Nevertheless, eventual internal EU borders and the inherent freedom of movement is not only the only thing that worries Turkey. The new external borders trouble policy makers in the EU and Turkey alike. In the Accession Partnership Agreement of 2007 Turkey promised that it would 
‘Unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations; address any sources of friction with neighbours; and refrain from any action which could adversely affect the process of peaceful settlement of border disputes.’​[255]​
The region in which Turkey lies is well-known for its political instability and regional/internal disputes. Although Turkey is working on its neighborly relations and regional cooperation – an important part of EU policy​[256]​ – illegal immigration (movements away from the conflicts in the region) poses a big problem for Turkey and the EU.  After accession it would be some time before Turkey becomes part of the Schengen zone, and accession to the Schengen zone will be determined by Turkey’s ability to protect its external borders.​[257]​ As Turkey wishes to profit from free movement of workers in the EU, Turkey will have to tackle the border issues, terminate the agreements with third countries and increase the level of border controls. 
But the biggest problem for Turkey in terms of the FMOW, are the regional disparities and the urban – rural income differences.  Already extensively discussed in the CAP expectations, the regional disparities will be a major challenge for Turkey. Relating to the large rural industry, the migration movements will be influenced by how the regional disparities are going to be resolved by the Turkish government. Inequality isn’t just present at an urban/rural level. Despite the lower average income level in the rural areas, the urban population has a more pronounced difference in average income levels.​[258]​ The GDP in Turkey already is the lowest that the EU has seen in an enlargement, and the GDP is predicted to increase in the momentum after accession.​[259]​ The current data suggest that because of the low GDP the whole of Turkey’s territory is eligible for assistance through Structural and Cohesion Funds from the EU.​[260]​ However, the dissolution of the agricultural sector as the main occupation of the Turks after the completion of the ARIP program in Turkey would even increase the income differences and worsen employment growth.​[261]​ According to some research, Turkey is the only country of the new member states where the incentive to migrate is larger in the rural areas than in the urban areas.​[262]​ Although the migration in Turkey now focuses on the rural to urban movement​[263]​, eventual migration to other countries will become desirable for Turks if the income inequalities persist. The Turkish government thus faces the challenge of conversing the income levels in all of Turkey as soon as possible to EU levels in order to hopefully reduce the incentive to migrate to more prosperous countries. 


2.3.2 Problems and expectations EU


The EU is – to a certain extant understandably – cautious about opening its borders to Turkey and the Turkish migrants. Negotiations from the EU perspective on the FMOW would evolve around the migratory pressure from Turkey and will certainly be of huge importance for any outcome of the negotiations. The concerns of the EU are based on the large GDP gap, which in the case of Turkey is as high as about 70 per cent. The previous southern enlargement also showed a GDP gap; however that gap wasn’t as substantial as this southern enlargement.​[264]​ Alongside the obvious migration of Turks seeking prosperity in an enlarged EU, the EU has a certain fear for the increasing number of third-country citizens entering the EU. Whether they enter the EU illegally or through asylum mechanisms, the discussion about the immigrant policy of the EU progresses along the lines of the expanding borders, and how to control the number of illegal immigrants.​[265]​ Turkey’s accession would have to increase the co-operation in the fields of organized crime, which in the case of the border controls includes drug and human trafficking, and illegal migration.​[266]​ The EU has demonstrated during the accession negotiations with the CEEC’s that it will not budge on border issues. 
Turkey hasn’t concluded any readmission agreements with neither the EU or any third countries, which is a significant deficient in the eyes of the EU.​[267]​ Particularly now that the EU has recently developed a new overall strategy with regards to re-admittance of illegal immigrants with Africa and other third countries, the EU wishes to see stricter regulations in place in Turkey before it will even commence negotiations on the FMOW. An element of the Schengen Agreement is carrier liability for the illegal entry to the EU territories of third-country nationals.​[268]​ The European Council concluded in December 2006 that the cooperation with third countries on policies such as re-admittance will be enhanced through effective identification and administration, and will put an emphasis on the successful reintegration into the illegal migrants’ national society.​[269]​ In the eyes of the EU, readmission agreements should inspire countries wishing to accede to model their immigration policy to EU’s strategy.​[270]​ Since Turkey has recently concluded the abolishment of visas with third-countries, the EU fears and expects that without the readmission agreements in place in Turkey, the EU will have to pay the price for the influx of illegal migrants.  
As regards to the legal migration after the Turkish accession, estimates vary wildly from 0.5 million Turks migrating to Europe to numbers as high as 4.4 million.​[271]​  Although these estimates may cause apprehension in the EU about opening its borders, it could also help in certain demographic problems that challenge the EU. The ageing of the population in the EU is a growing problem. Not only is the EU confronted with an increasing ‘grey’ population, aging is increasingly becoming a global problem.​[272]​ Estimates predict a long-term gap in labor-supply in the EU as the demographics are starting to turn against the prosperity of the western countries.​[273]​  Of all of the new partners in the EU, Turkey relatively has the youngest population and therefore would be best suited to fill the aging gap.​[274]​  However, the young population of Turkey is also reason for concern – this country has the fastest growing demographics in the EU, whose population will also age in time. In other words – will Turkey in the long-term be able to fill the age gap? Undoubtedly the EU will need a new group of younger laborers to continue their economic prosperity. It can be expected that within the EU the discussion about the potential role of Turkey in an ‘older’ but economically strong Europe will be prominent during negotiations. 
However, the most important determinant for a successful negotiating round on the FMOW comes from within the EU itself – will the opponents and supporters of free movement of labor and goods be able to unify themselves before and during the negotiations? The expectancy in the EU is that this will be one of the chapters that spark's the fiercest discussions on whether or not Turkey should accede. Opposition especially from Germany and France is ferocious​[275]​, however that shouldn’t shift the attention away from the fact that migration at the moment is a serious policy concern for Europe.​[276]​  Estimates show that Turkish migration movements could be measured in comparison to the migration movement after the accession of the CEEC’s.​[277]​ Mass-migration isn’t expected in the estimates, but the migration numbers will be substantial at least.​[278]​ Nonetheless, opening the EU borders to Turkish migrants implies the biggest implications for Germany, as most of the Turkish migrants are expected to settle themselves there​[279]​, due to the migration movements of the past and the large Turkish community in Germany. Opposition from Germany in this sense isn’t unexpected or unreasonable, yet in order to continue negotiations a sound consideration of priorities is in place – to what extent should fear dominate the negotiations? The negotiators from Europe have the delicate task of aligning opposition and supporters.

2.3.3  Negotiations? 


Negotiations on the FMOW have been suspended in December 2006, and there is no sign that the negotiations will be commenced again in the near future. However, the impact the outcome of these negotiations will have on the relationship between the EU and Turkey is expected to be significant. 

2.3.3.1	 Conflicting Economic Interests 

A properly functioning labor market is in the economic interest of both the EU and Turkey. The National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis has set out a framework to converge the Turkish labor market to EU levels, where 
‘[…] the main objectives of [the] employment policy are to enhance employment opportunities, to strengthen the link between education and labour market, to increase the efficiency of the labour market, to provide equal opportunities for the employment of the disadvantaged groups, to promote active labour programmes on the basis of the requirements of the labour market, to reduce informal employment and to increase decent work.’​[280]​
This ambitious employment policy has yet to show its results, but efforts are made nonetheless. Turkey knows that these reforms are needed in order to gain in prosperity and labor market opportunities for the entire Turkish population. The Turkish anticipated ‘brain drain’ that will follow if the labor market in Turkey fails to be adequately converged to EU levels will in the short term benefit the EU. In fact, the EU promotes the migration of these so called ‘knowledge migrants’​[281]​, calling it a ‘brain gain’. However, the growth of the Turkish market will suffer from a drain in educated worker. Therefore the EU and Turkey should join forces and stimulate programs to keep the ‘brains’ In Turkey where they are needed, in the (eventual) economic interest of both. 
The regional disparities and how to tackle the problems that come with these disparities have been discussed for the CAP under the header ‘institutional format, and for the FMOW it also is a matter of whether the current member states of the EU are willing to cough up the required financial assistance. However, the nature of the FMOW makes the regional disparities more a matter of conflicting economic interest. Investments now could decrease the incentive to migrate in the future. Turkey’s regional disparities combined with a low GDP per head (lowest that any enlargement has seen) require significant support from the Structural and Cohesion Funds over a long period of time. Splitting the country into regions that are eligible for funding and regions that are ineligible is impossible – due to the low Turkish GDP all of Turkey is entitled to funding.​[282]​ Conversely, the impact of the Structural and Cohesion Funds varies significantly. Previous experiences show that Structural funds alone are not sufficient for the convergence to EU income levels, what is needed are
‘[...] macroeconomic stability and a proper functioning of goods, capital and labour markets for the process of income convergence.’​[283]​ Without a properly functioning economic framework, all the funding in the world will not be enough. Therefore in the negotiations the EU will probably insist on properly functioning institutions in Turkey whom are responsible for the allocation of the funds, before there will be sufficient funding to embark on decreasing the regional disparities. 
	Turkey is eligible for pre-accession financial assistance, which should be used by Turkey to set up a regional development policy to be able to partake in the EU programs to strengthen economic and social cohesion. Also, Turkey will need to use the pre-accession assistance to embark on a long-term process of modernizing its educational and training systems, create an economic atmosphere that attracts investors and update Turkey’s infrastructure and administrative capacity.​[284]​ Combining the successful implementation of all these measures on the labor market and financial assistance prior to accession and during the negotiations will make the EU lessen its restrictions on Turkey and increases the incentive in the EU to invest in a potential stable partner. However, if Turkey fails to modernize on its road to accession, the economic favorable momentum for Turkey and the EU will be lost.  Estimates predict that if the EU is willing to merely distribute their Structural and Cohesion Funds to the poorest member states and reforms the structure of the financial assistance system, the budget consequences for the EU should be limited.​[285]​ The EU should wisely consider these budget reforms, as other estimates predict an increase instead of an decrease in migration pressure from Turkey if Turkey’s high economic growth rates (despite the low GDP per head) and financial assistance from the EU are lost.​[286]​ Short-term financial losses will have to be weighed against the overflowing of the EU labor market in the future at the negotiations table.  
The EU for one would not want this momentum to lose ground. The ageing of the population is a gigantic challenge in the coming era, however attracting migrant workers (again) will only be a solution for the short-term prospects. At first the young workers from Turkey will fill the labor demand gap in Europe, but in the long-term the migrants will settle in Europe and start to age in the EU themselves, merely delaying the problem of ageing Europeans.​[287]​  However, in light of an impeding ‘crisis’ in labor supply, the EU would have to make the management of migration a priority instead of trying to prevent migration, and accept the short-term demographic differentials and use the Turkish temporarily labor supply as an advantage.​[288]​ Turkey is the only (potential) acceding country with a relatively young population. Therefore the Turks are the best option – for now – to fill the gap.​[289]​ The best solution in terms of preventing (future) conflicting economic interests during and after negotiations, is for the EU to invest in the future of the Turkish labor market and to lift the tight restrictions on migration movements. For Turkey an option would be to reform the labor market and stimulate the economic development at home. This way, the problem of ageing will temporarily be deferred but economic prosperity in the EU will remain and Turkey’s market will become an attractive alternative instead of opting for migration. 

2.3.3.2  Institutional format 

Problems and expectations of a more institutional nature include the instable borders of Turkey, and after accession, the newly enlarged borders of the EU. The Accession Partnership of 2007 obliged Turkey to 
‘Unequivocally commit to good neighborly relations; address any source of friction with neighbors; and refrain from any action which could adversely affect the process of peaceful settlement of border disputes.’​[290]​  
Recently Turkey has made a first attempt at stabilizing relations with Armenia (with whom it has/had a longstanding dispute due to historic events) and started to preach a more ‘regional’ cooperation policy, focusing its foreign policy on the countries in the region.​[291]​ Although this on the one hand should reassure the EU of a more stable region, on the other hand its shows a focus away from relations with the EU. Agreements that Turkey concludes now with third countries will have to be evaluated and perhaps even abolished when accession negotiations with the EU recommence. The good relations with neighbors that Turkey had committed itself to in the Accession Partnership could undermine the efforts to align Turkey’s foreign policy with the EU’s acquis, which essentially is the desired result of the negotiations. Reaffirming relations with ‘undesired’ countries (in the eyes of the EU, such as Iran) will complicate negotiations in a way that the credibility of Turkey as a negotiation partner is weakened. This in turn could prompt opponents of Turkish accession in the EU to advocate their opposition with more vigor.  
The complicated relationship of Greece and Turkey also undermines the institutional order of the negotiations. As Greece is a member of the EU it has the right to veto any decision. Even before Turkey was considered as a candidate state, Greece proved to be very inflexible in the decision making processes involving Turkey.​[292]​  Although Greece eventually did allow Turkey to be considered for full EU membership, it now has lapsed back into the veto position, undermining any progress for Turkey’s membership negotiations. The ultimate demonstration of the veto power resulted in the suspension of eight policy chapters in 2006, and Greece continues to protect the state of Cyprus. The bilateral format in this sense excludes any political dialogue, as the significance of the member state’s veto is placed above the broader picture – that of Turkish accession.​[293]​ Greece will remain inflexible if the conflict about Cyprus remains unresolved, and will prohibit any progress on the negotiations.  
Relating to the relationship with neighboring states are the problems that the EU anticipates at the new borders. The regional cooperation may increase, however that could also imply that entering the EU with Turkey as a member state will become easier. The EU currently endorses an inconsistent immigration policy – it wants to be an open and secure Union while at the same time the Union promotes the need for constant control of the external borders.​[294]​ An ‘open’ Union cannot be rimed with an immigration strategy that primarily tries to prevent immigrants from reaching the EU’s territory.​[295]​ Turkey has a special position in the asylum procedures at the moment. Both a transit country for applicants of asylum and a country of origin for asylum applicants in the EU, controlling the borders will be of crucial importance to the EU. In previous negotiations the EU has never made an exception on border issues, and it is highly unlikely that an exception will be made for Turkey. Consequently, Turkey will have to improve their border controls significantly before the EU is even willing to talk about FMOW. On a more positive note, it is expected that Turkey’s number of asylum applicants will decrease after accession, as the Kurds (whom are now responsible for the main portion of asylums from Turkey) will enjoy the rights constituted in the European Convention on Human Rights.​[296]​ 
One of the other options would be for the EU to engage in programs handling the asylum ‘problem’ at the grass root level, thus improving the situation at home and therefore taking away the need to migrate. If Turkey accedes to the EU, the pre-accession aid and aid after accession could be used to improve the economic and social circumstances for the Turks. As for third country nationals, these asylum applicants will have to await the outcome of their case in Turkey. The Dublin Regulation would apply to Turkey as a member state, thus implying that illegal immigrants that have travelled to the EU through Turkey will have to wait for their case to be heard in Turkey itself. In this case, the number of asylum applicants in the current member states would decrease, moving the problem to Turkey.​[297]​ Turkey will need financial and institutional assistance to handle to new responsibilities. As mentioned before, Turkey currently lacks the correct implementation of laws and regulations regarding migration, and ‘[…] developing an asylum system would be costly and could raise the issue of burden sharing by the current Member States in order to ensure solidarity with Turkey.’​[298]​ Whether the negotiations can proceed thus will depend on the EU’s willingness to ‘share the burden’ temporarily until Turkey is able to handle the institutional responsibilities on its own, on Turkey’s priorities in its foreign policy – the region or the EU – and the EU’s ability to look at long-term perspectives.    
As regard to the ‘foreigners’ policy in place in Turkey, the Turkish government has to make a serious effort to reform their policy. Foreign investment is essential for the Turkish economy, and companies will be unwilling to invest as long as their employees are unable to control their investments. Furthermore, the EU will asses the opening of its borders on the efforts made at the Turkish side. The Progress Report on Turkey in 2008 stated that the required legislation to ease procedures on granting work permits for foreigners had been vetoed in Parliament, and no further efforts had been made to align the Turkish policy to the European policies on the FMOW.​[299]​ As long as Turkey doesn’t ease procedures for foreigners to obtain a work permit in Turkey, the EU will be unwilling to grant the rights and privileges to Turkish migrants that EU citizens enjoy. 
However, the negotiations will most likely be dominated by the discussion in the current EU Member States on whether Turkey and the Turkish immigrants really are/can become a part of Europe. The overwhelming ‘fear’ of the mass-migration form Turkey once it becomes a member of the Union is present in every debate about the accession. This happened before the 2004 enlargement as well, with the biggest enlargement in the history of the EU. The migrants from Poland that would overflow the labor market in Europe, many people feared the accession. Nevertheless, the actual implications turned out to be much less significant than expected, and the anticipated ‘mass-migration’ did not take place.​[300]​ The potential accession of Turkey has however sparked that fear once more. The integration of the first wave of immigrants from the 1970’ies and their families now turns out to be less successful than previously thought, and is causing tension in the EU societies. The EU admits and emphasizes that integration is essentially a two way process​[301]​, but efforts in the last decade have been lacking for both the host society and the immigrants.  Societies are starting to divide themselves along ‘us-them’ lines, which is also noticeable in the growth of anti-immigrant political movements.​[302]​ 
The EU itself has already headed Turkey in a special ‘sub-category’ with regards to the Negotiating Framework. Transition periods have always been included in negotiations with candidate member states, with success – both the parties would have some additional time to adjust their policies to successfully integrate with each other, albeit did the adjusting usually happen at the new member state’s side. However, for Turkey the Negotiating Framework (already) mentions permanent safeguard clauses, which could suggest that the member states of the EU would have the right to suspend the free movement of Turkish nationals after accession on a permanent basis.​[303]​  This begs the discussion on whether these permanent clauses would undermine a fundamental part of the EU’s acquis communautaire, the principle of non-discrimination based on one’s nationality. If the permanent safeguard clauses are included in any accession treaty, it would be the introduction of a ‘[…] differentiated enjoyment of fundamental freedoms along national lines.’​[304]​  The EU should beware of including these clauses, as that would only reinforce the idea that Turkey cannot fully be a part of Europe, and the kind of message that would sent to the three million Turkish immigrants already living within the borders of the EU. 




One way or another, migration of Turkish nationals to the current member states of the EU is going to happen, no matter what the outcome of the negotiation process with the EU and Turkey will be. However, in economic terms, the EU and Turkey would be better off with accession, as the incentive for migration can be diminished once Turkey’s economy converges to EU levels. In the short-term, a certain amount of migrants would benefit the European market, which currently is dealing with an ageing population. On an institutional or rather a bilateral format of the negotiations level, the EU needs to unite the politicians and citizens of Turkey and the EU to support accession. The consequences for migration will be greater if Turkey doesn’t accede, in numerical and integration terms. The EU has the upper hand during negotiations, as it is up to the acceding country to adjust – however, this time the consequences will be at the expense of the EU, as migration is also subject to political stability. 

































In the negotiations with Turkey, the EU enjoys the same privileges that it had during the negotiations with Spain. As Turkey is the country wishing to accede, the Turkish government has to adjust to the European standards, not the other way around. Hindering any flexibility in the EU’s position is the uncertainty of the impact of Turkey’s accession, especially in the field of the FMOW. The CAP will only be mildly influenced after Turkey’s accession. The Customs Union has already taken care of the bulk of the revisions in the agricultural relationship, and the problems that have been described are of minor influence as opposed to the influence of the decisions on the FMOW. The FMOW scares European politicians and citizens as so much of the results of granting the Turks unlimited access to the European labor markets remains vague. Transitional arrangements might once more work, as they have done in the Spanish case. However closing the borders to any migration and breaking of the negotiations with Turkey will only increase the migratory pressure – as long as Turkey does not enjoy the same standards of living as the Europeans, they will always try to move to more prosperous parts of the world.   










































                           Conflicting interests vs. bilateral issues
                                                  Conclusion


To what extent did/do the interests and/or the format of the accession negotiations result in obstructions regarding the accession negotiations between the EEC/EU and Spain/Turkey?

The aim of this research was to contrast the Turkish accession to the accession of Spain, in order to establish whether the negotiations with the EU are undermined by insurmountable interests, or if the chosen format of the negotiations – bilateral – complicates the pace of the negotiations, one cannot truly contrast the cases. Turkey’s accession is on hold, negotiations have been suspended for a long period of time, whereas the accession process of Spain has been concluded a long time ago and the accession process as a whole has been analyzed. However, what can be contrasted  is how the EEC/EU has treated the newly acceding countries and how the EEC/EU behaved during the negotiations, and how Spain and Turkey respectively responded to their particular treatment. Eventually comparing Spain’s accession and Turkey’s relation with the EU up until now could provide some sort of answer, because the behavioural patterns could supply us with some insights on how Turkey’s (potential) accession will proceed. Thus, what could and would be the decisive factor in the negotiations, the conflicting interests or the bilateral format? 
Prior to the opening of negotiations both Spain and Turkey had been struggling to establish some sort of relationship with the EEC/EU. Politically both countries weren’t exactly desirable states in the eyes of the EEC. Spain still was ruled by a military dictatorship, and Turkey may have been an ally of the US in fighting the communist threat – Turkey’s politics altogether were dominated by the Turkish military. Commercially however, the EEC/EU had always been interested, as Spain concluded the first trade agreement with the EEC in 1970, while Turkey had been earlier in trade relations – Turkey had installed the Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963. For both, the eventual aim was to become a member state of the European cooperation. Yet at the time the goal of free trade with the EEC/EU was more suitable for the political climate.  The same climate also allowed Spain to accede sooner than Turkey, as Spain had been in the throes of completing the transition to democracy, whereas Turkey had been denied membership on democratic grounds until 2004. Nevertheless, up until now both countries were/are considered eligible for membership of the EEC/EU. The domestic attitudes in the acceding countries differ – the Spaniards believed that accession would grant them their rightful place in Europe; they believed they belonged in Europe. The Turkish citizens on the other hand are tempered in their initial enthusiasm – as the negotiations keep being postponed many Turks wonder whether they even should wish to accede to the EU. 
 When one looks at the conflicting economic interests during both the ‘negotiations’, the solution for Spain came in the form of implementing transitional agreements. After the endless negotiations on the consequences the Spanish production of olive oil would have on the European markets, all the parties found a way to move forward through the transitional agreements. Conflicting economic interests are not a structural problem; they can be overcome through negotiations. The whole point of negotiating the terms of accession is to overcome any conflicting economic interest before the accession would take place, rather than admitting new member states right away. Any two parties that come together have to agree upon the terms of cooperation, there will always be conflicting interests. It depends on the setting of the dialogue whether the conflicting interests can become matters of mutual interests. For Spain, the conflicting interests were turned around into mutual benefits, and nowadays Spain is a strong partner in the European Union. Negotiations between the EU and Turkey could end in the same manner; the problem for them does not lie with the conflicting interests. The Customs Union already establishes that Turkey and the EU would be capable to cooperate on a commercial and economic basis. 
However, the bilateral format is a different subject. The manner in which the negotiations are conducted are the problem regarding to the progress of the negotiations. Spain was the party that had to wait for the EEC to conclude on their Common Position, before negotiations could proceed. Especially France blocked the accession, simply be refusing any proposal on the table. All Spain could do, was wait for the internal cohesion of the EEC to re-emerge. Only when the member states were able to unite themselves did the negotiations with Spain come to a successful end. However, before they could unite themselves, individual member states would abuse the bilateral format by refusing cooperating with the proposals until they would ´get what they want´. The moment each of the member states saw their demands sufficiently met did the bilateral format work. Turkey is experiencing similar issues. Greece vetoes anything that has to do with Turkey as long as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved. Any progress in other less significant policy chapters is thus halted, resulting in an indefinite standstill of the negotiations. 
Ultimately, the conflicting economic interests do not dominate the outcome of negotiations as much as chosen format of the EEC/EU negotiations, the bilateral format. Conflicting (economic) interests are points both the negotiating parties can work on, in order to align the hopes and wishes of both sides. They might pose a problem when negotiating, but eventually the problems are surmountable, if both sides commit to it. During the Spanish negotiations the conflicting interests did not cause the bureaucratic delays or the heated arguments with the French and Italian farmers, whom were afraid their production would suffer from the new market. For the Turkish negotiations the same could be said - with the help of investments and an allocation of production, the conflicting economic interests should be solvable. The transitional agreements took the pressure of the Spanish accession and allowed Spain and the EEC to slowly adjust to each other after enlargement. If Turkey ever accedes, probably we will once more see a solution in transitional agreements. Conflicting economic interests merely delay the negotiations in a sense that there has to be time to consider the options, an how to work past the hurdles. 
This is contrasting to the bilateral format. As opposed to conflicting interests, trouble due to the format of the negotiations has to be addressed at one side of the negotiations table; it is not something both parties can work on. The bilateral format implies internal cohesion, but looking at the accession processes one can see that internal cohesion is absent on the EEC/EU side. Progress is lacking as long as there is no internal cohesion on the EU side. Spain was suffering from this format, forced to accept unfavourable terms and conditions for accession, and unable to negotiate – the ´take it or leave it´ attitude of the EEC excluded any possibility of renegotiating the common position. The delays in the negotiations were not caused by Spain, contrarily, they were caused by the difficulties that the EEC had in reaching a common position. Turkey will certainly be put in the same position if the negotiations are revitalized. Not only does Greece question the viability of Turkey as a member state, so do Germany and France. Many more countries in the European Union are wondering aloud whether Turkey should be considered as a serious option for an enlarged EU. Negotiations will only proceed with more difficultly as long as the EU is unable to speak with one voice. Imagine the discussions it will take to offer Turkey a reasonable option in any policy chapter if the head of state of the EU question Turkey’s status in public. 




















































Advies – Arbeidsmigratiebeleid. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2007)

Advies van de commissie internationale sociaal-economische aangelegenheden - De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2004)

Arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU – advies over de arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU uitgebracht aan de minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2001)

Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community. European Commission (Brussels 1982)

Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged community. European Commission (Brussels 1984)

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2007-2008. European Commission (Brussels 2007)

Consultation on Migration policies vis-à-vis third Countries. European Commission (Brussels 1979) 

De financiering van de Europese Gemeenschap Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Den Haag 1987) 

De onvoltooide Europese Integratie, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Den Haag 1986)

Enlargement of the Community - Economic and sectoral aspects. European Commission (Brussels 1978) 
 
Enlargement of the European Community – Greece – Spain – Portugal. Economic and social committee of the European Community (Brussels 1979)

EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration: Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte (München 2001) 

Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1978)

Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1980) 

Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1981)

Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1983)

Europese Raad van Brussel 14/15 december 2006- Conclusies van het voorzitterschap. Raad van de Europese Unie (Brussels 2007)

General considerations on the problems of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 1978) 

Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective. European Commission (Brussels 2004) 

Mededeling van de Commissie – Strategiedocument 2005 over de uitbreiding. Europese Commissie (Brussel 2005) 

Naar rustiger vaarwater: een advies over betrekkingen tussen Turkije en de Europese Unie. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Den Haag 1999 

National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis. Government of Turkey (Ankara 2005) 

Opinion on Spain’s application for membership, European Commission (Brussels 1978)

Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals. European Commission (Brussels 1982)

Proposal for a Council decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey and repealing decision 2006/35/EC. European Commission (Brussels 2007)

Regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. European Commission (Brussels 2004) 

Spanish agriculture and enlargement. European Parliament (Brussels 1983) 

The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain. Agricultural information service of the Directorate-General for agriculture European Community Commission (Brussels 1980)

The free movement of workers in the context of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 2001) 

The transitional period and the institutional implications of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 1978)

Turkey: Economic reforms, living standards and social welfare study. World Bank (Washington DC. 2000)

Turkey 2005 progress report. European Commission (Brussels 2005) 

Turkey 2007 progress report. European Commission (Brussels 2007)
 







Barroso, J.M.D., ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: The EU/Turkey Partnership’, (11th  April 2008) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/191&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu​/​rapid​/​pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH​/​08​/​191&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en​) , checked 25th January 2010 

BBC, ‘Ottoman Empire’ (4th September 2009) http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml (​http:​/​​/​www.bbc.co.uk​/​religion​/​religions​/​islam​/​history​/​ottomanempire_1.shtml​), checked 25th January 2010 

Boeri,T. and Brücker, H., ‘Eastern enlargement and EU labour markets: perceptions, challenges and opportunities’, World Economics (WE) (2001)

Cakmak, E., ‘Structural change and market opening in agriculture’, CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers No. 10, Centre for European Studies (Brussels 2004)

Çarkoglu, A. ed., Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics (London 2003) 

Chislett, W.  Spanish Trajectory – a source of inspiration for Turkey? (Istanbul 2008) 

Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, ‘What is the current status?’ (March 18th 2010) http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Muzakereler,Muzakereler_Sayfalar.html?pageindex=3 (​http:​/​​/​www.avrupa.info.tr​/​AB_ve_Turkiye​/​Muzakereler,Muzakereler_Sayfalar.html?pageindex=3​) , checked  October 8 2009   

Deschamps,E., ‘The problem of Iberian agricultural product’, European Navigator (last modification unknown) http://www.ena.lu/problem_iberian_agricultural_products-2-6522 (​http:​/​​/​www.ena.lu​/​problem_iberian_agricultural_products-2-6522​) , checked 3rd November 2009    

Deschamps, E. ‘The Free Movement of Workers’,  European Navigator (last modification unknown) http://www.ena.lu/free_movement_workers-2-6523 (​http:​/​​/​www.ena.lu​/​free_movement_workers-2-6523​), checked 3rd November 2009
European Commission, European Regional Development Fund (17th July 2008) http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/feder/index_en.htm (​http:​/​​/​ec.europa.eu​/​regional_policy​/​funds​/​feder​/​index_en.htm​) , checked 30 December 2009

Deringel, S. ‘The Turks and ‘Europe’: the argument from history’, Middle Eastern Studies vol. 43 no. 5 (2007) 709-723 

Erzan, R. and Kirisci,K., ‘Conclusion’, TS vol. 7 no. 1 (2006) 163-172 

Erzan, R., Kusubas U. and Yildiz, N., ‘Immigration scenarios: Turkey-EU’, Turkish Studies (TS) vol. 7 no. 1 (2006) 33-44 

Europa, ‘the history of the European Union (last modification unknown) http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu​/​abc​/​history​/​1945-1959​/​index_en.htm​) , checked 25th January 2010 

European Commission, ‘The DOHA Round’, (1st March 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/doha/ (​http:​/​​/​ec.europa.eu​/​trade​/​creating-opportunities​/​eu-and-wto​/​doha​/​​) , checked 18th January 2010 
 
Eur-Lex, (last modification unknown)  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21998D0320(01):EN:HTML (​http:​/​​/​eur-lex.europa.eu​/​LexUriServ​/​LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21998D0320(01):EN:HTML​), checked 18th January 2010

Europa Nu, ‘Spanje’ (last modification unknown) http://www.europa- nu.nl/9353000/1/j9vvh6nf08temv0/vgaxlcr0e01i?tab=2&start_008_05c=10 (​http:​/​​/​www.europa- nu.nl​/​9353000​/​1​/​j9vvh6nf08temv0​/​vgaxlcr0e01i?tab=2&start_008_05c=10​) , checked August 19th 2009

European Union, ‘DECISION No 1/95 OF THE EC-TURKEY ASSOCIATION COUNCIL of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc_115267.pdf (​http:​/​​/​trade.ec.europa.eu​/​doclib​/​docs​/​2003​/​december​/​tradoc_115267.pdf​) , checked 18th January 2010 

Farrell, M. ‘Regional integration and cohesion – lessons from Spain and Ireland in the EU’, Journal of Asian Economics 14, (2004) 927 – 946

García-Ferrer, ‘Interactions between internal migration, employment growth, and regional income differences in Spain’, Journal of Development Economics 7 (1980) 211-229

Grigoriadis, I.N., ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU – debating the most difficult enlargement ever’, SAIS Review vol. 26 no. 1 (2006) 147-160 

Hug, A., ‘Introduction Turkey’s future lies in Europe in Turkey’ in Idem ed.: Turkey in Europe: the economic case for Turkish membership of the EU (London 2008) 11-20 

Johnson, R., ‘Driving towards the EU using its rear-view mirror: Turkey’s “foreigner” policy’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 7 no. 1 (2008) 33-43 

Krieger, H. and Maitre, B. ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, TS vol.7 no.1 (2006) 45-66 

Longworth, N.  ‘Agricultural production, prices and trade’, in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed.,Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 57-88 
Maresceau, M., ‘The EU pre-accession strategies; a political and legal analysis’;  in Idem ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: an comparative analysis (New York 2001 

Maresceau, M. and Edward Lennon ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: a comparative analysis, (New York 2001), xix

Maxwell, K. Spiegel, S.,  The new Spain: from isolation to influence, (New York 1994) 

New York Times, ‘Een gekwetst Turkije kan rare sprongen maken’, De Volkskrant ( 29 oktober 2009 ) 

Nicolaides, P. ea., A guide to the enlargement of the EU(II): A review of the process, negotiations, policy reforms and enforcement capacity (Maastricht 1999)

Nillion, C. ‘Negotiating Turkeys membership: can member states do as they please?’, European Constitutional Law Review vol. 3 (2007) 269–284

OECD Stat. Extracts, ‘country statistical profiles 2009 – Turkey’ (last modification unkown) http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=18172&querytype=view&lang=en (​http:​/​​/​stats.oecd.org​/​viewhtml.aspx?queryname=18172&querytype=view&lang=en​) 18th of January 2010 

Oskam, A. ‘Overview of agricultural, food , rural and structural policies’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed.,Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 127-148

Oskam, A. , Longworth N.  and Vilchez, I.M.,  ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed.,Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 217-250

Oskam, A., Longworth, N.,  and Yildiz, A., ‘Turkey’s economy and regional income distribution’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 9-26

Pollet, K. ‘The European Union and migratory pressure from the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe’ in: Marc Maresceau ea., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: a comparative analysis (New York 2001) 

Raux, J. ‘Towards a pan-Euro-Mediterranean association of proximity’, in Marc Maresceasu ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: an comparative analysis (New York 2001

Redmond, J. and Rosenthal, G.G.ea., The expanding European Union – past, present, future (London 1998)

Rehn, O. ‘45 Years from the Signing of the Ankara Agreement: EU-Turkey –cooperation continues’ (4th of November 2008)  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/581&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu​/​rapid​/​pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH​/​08​/​581&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en​) , checked 25th January 2010 

Royo, S. and Manuel, P.C. ea., Spain and Portugal in the EU: the first 15 years, (London Portland 2003) 

Ruano, L. ‘Origin and implications of the European Union’s enlargement negotiations procedure’ EUI Working Papers (2002)

Ruano, L. ‘The Common Agricultural Policy and the European Union’s enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe: a comparison with the Spanish case’, EUI Working Papers (2003)

Ruano, L. ‘The consolidation of democracy vs. the price of olive oil: The story of why the CAP delayed Spain’s entry to the EC’, Journal of European Integration History vol. 11 num. 2(2005) 97-118 

Temel, T. ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’, in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed.,Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 251-278

Temel, T., ‘The institutional framework of Turkey and Turkish agriculture’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed.,Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 27-56

The World Bank, ‘Turkey – Agricultural Reform Implementation’, (last modification unknown) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20188065~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361712,00.html (​http:​/​​/​web.worldbank.org​/​WBSITE​/​EXTERNAL​/​COUNTRIES​/​ECAEXT​/​TURKEYEXTN​/​0,,contentMDK:20188065~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361712,00.html​), 17th January 2010 

Turkey and Europe: the decisive year ahead. International Crisis Group (Istanbul/Brussels 2008)

‘Turkey and the EU: Progress toward accession’, International Debates (2003) 

Turkish Foreign Ministry, ‘Main issues Turkey and the EU – EU accession negotiations’ (10th July 2008)    http://www.mfa.gov.tr/eu-accession-negotiations.en.mfa (​http:​/​​/​www.mfa.gov.tr​/​eu-accession-negotiations.en.mfa​) , checked 25th January 2010
 
Ugur, M. ‘The Turkish economy and the EU Connection: the case for moving beyond engineered uncertainty’ in Adam Hug ed.: Turkey in Europe: the economic case for Turkish membership of the EU (London 2008)26-36 

Wiarda, H.J., The transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal,(Washington 1989) 

Woods, M.,  Leavell, H. and Maniam, B. ‘An analysis of Turkey’s prospects of European Union accession’, The Business Review vol. 11 no. 2 (2008) 11-17

 Yavuz, M.H., Khan, M.R., ‘Turkey and Europe: will East meet West?’, Current History (2004) 389-393










^1	  Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, ‘What is the current status?’ (March 18th 2010) http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Muzakereler,Muzakereler_Sayfalar.html?pageindex=3 , checked  October 8 2009  
^2	  New York Times, ‘Een gekwetst Turkije kan rare sprongen maken’, De Volkskrant ( 29 oktober 2009 ) 
^3	  L. Ruano, ‘Origin and implications of the European Union’s enlargement negotiations procedure’ EUI Working Papers (2002). For an extensive overview of how Ruano constructs her argument. 
^4	  K. Maxwell, S. Spiegel, The new Spain: from isolation to influence, (New York 1994) 92
^5	  H.J. Wiarda, The transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal,(Washington 1989) 176
^6	  Ibidem, 181
^7	  Europa Nu, ‘Spanje’ (last update unknown) http://www.europa- nu.nl/9353000/1/j9vvh6nf08temv0/vgaxlcr0e01i?tab=2&start_008_05c=10 , checked August 19th 2009
^8	  W. Chislett, Spanish Trajectory – a source of inspiration for Turkey? (Istanbul 2008) 6. For a more extensive overview of his research
^9	  Ibidem, 8
^10	  Ibidem, I, 4
^11	  Ruano, ‘Origin and implications’, 2
^12	  S. Royo and P.C. Manuel ea., Spain and Portugal in the EU: the first 15 years, (London Portland 2003) 8
^13	  John Redmond and Glenda G. Rosenthal ea., The expanding European Union – past, present, future (London 1998) 89
^14	  Royo, ‘Spain and Portugal in the EU’, 14
^15	  Ruano,  ‘Origins and implications’, 2
^16	  Redmond , ‘The expanding European Union’, 134
^17	  Ibidem, 136
^18	  Ibidem, I, 137
^19	  Opinion on Spain’s application for membership, European Commission (Brussels 1978) 45
^20	  Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1980) 14
^21	  Opinion on Spain’s application for membership, 9
^22	  Wiarda, ‘The transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal’, 197
^23	  Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1981) 1
^24	  Europe Information Spain, 1980, 2
^25	  Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1978) 2
^26	  Maxwell ,’The new Spain’, 14
^27	  Chislett, ‘Spanish Trajectory’, 11
^28	  Maxwell ,’The new Spain’, 5
^29	  Wiarda, ‘The transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal’, 181
^30	  Europe Information Spain, 1978, 2
^31	  Europe Information external relations – Spain and the European Community. Commission of the European Communities spokesman’s group and Directorate-General for information (Brussels 1983) 5. Although all countries negotiated separately with the Community, their accessions became increasingly linked – especially those of Portugal and Spain, because of their geographical position
^32	  Europe Information Spain, 1980, 9
^33	  Wiarda, ‘The transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal’, 194
^34	  The enlargement of the European Community, 2
^35	  Ruano, ‘Origin and Implications’, 2
^36	  Chislett, ‘Spanish trajectory’, 13
^37	  Maxwell, ‘The new Spain’, 38
^38	  Ibidem, 15
^39	  Ibidem,I,  17
^40	  L. Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy vs. the price of olive oil: The story of why the CAP delayed Spain’s entry to the EC’, Journal of European Integration History vol. 11 num. 2(2005)97-118, 110
^41	  E. Deschamps, ‘The problem of Iberian agricultural product’, European Navigator (last update unknown) http://www.ena.lu/problem_iberian_agricultural_products-2-6522 , checked 3rd November 2009   
^42	  General considerations on the problems of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 1978) 9
^43	  Enlargement of the Community - Economic and sectoral aspects. European Commission (Brussels 1978) 50
^44	  The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain. Agricultural information service of the Directorate-General for agriculture European Community Commission (Brussels 1980) 5
^45	  De financiering van de Europese Gemeenschap Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Den Haag 1987) 29
^46	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community. European Commission (Brussels 1982) 5
^47	  Opinion on Spain’s application for membership, 24
^48	  General considerations on the problems of enlargement, 9
^49	  The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain, 16
^50	  Opinion on Spain’s application for membership, 53
^51	  The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain, 14/15
^52	  Spanish agriculture and enlargement. European Parliament (Brussels 1983) 13
^53	   Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged community. European Commission (Brussels 1984), 3. Although not specifically stated in the text, one can see the advantage the EEC had in concluding the agreement with the MNMC’s in the safety clauses suggested for the EEC.
^54	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 5
^55	  Ibidem, 5
^56	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 9
^57	  Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged community, 5
^58	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 8
^59	  General considerations of the problems of enlargement, 7
^60	  Problems of enlargement: taking stock and proposals. European Commission (Brussels 1982) 6
^61	  Problems of enlargement: tacking stock and proposals, 8
^62	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 108
^63	  Spanish agriculture and enlargement, 3
^64	  Ruano,  ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 108
^65	  The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain, 5
^66	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 103
^67	  L. Ruano, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy and the European Union’s enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe: a comparison with the Spanish case’, EUI Working Papers (2003) 2
^68	  The agricultural aspects of enlargement of the European Community Spain, 16
^69	  Ruano, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy and the European Union’s enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe’, 2
^70	  De onvoltooide Europese Integratie, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Den Haag 1986) 76
^71	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 109
^72	  Ruano, ‘Origins and Implications’, 11 
^73	  The transitional period and the institutional implications of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 1978) 8
^74	  Problems of enlargement : tacking stock and proposals, 12
^75	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 111
^76	  Ibidem, 103
^77	  Ibidem, I, 108
^78	  Ruano, ‘Origins and implications’, abstract
^79	  Chislett, ‘Spanish trajectory’, 14
^80	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 113
^81	  Ibidem, 101
^82	  Ruano, ‘Origins and implications’, 117
^83	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 102
^84	  Ruano, ‘Origins and implications’, 15
^85	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 115
^86	  The enlargement of the European Community. European Commission (Brussels 1979) 7. Especially the French Midi region and the Italian Mezzogiorno region would suffer from the cheap Spanish competition. 
^87	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 102
^88	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 111
^89	  Problems of enlargement : tacking stock and proposals, 12
^90	  Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged community, 18
^91	  Ibidem, 17
^92	  Ibidem, I, 18
^93	  Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged community , 22
^94	  Ibidem, 21
^95	  Ibidem, I, 22
^96	  Ibidem, II, 11
^97	  General considerations of the problems of enlargement, 12
^98	  Deschamps ‘The problem of Iberian agricultural products’ European Navigator
^99	  Ibidem
^100	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 114
^101	  Ibidem, 114
^102	  P. Nicolaides ea., A guide to the enlargement of the EU(II): A review of the process, negotiations, policy reforms and enforcement capacity (Maastricht 1999) 33
^103	  Ruano, ‘Origins and implications’, 29
^104	  Ruano, ‘The consolidation of democracy’, 114
^105	  E. Deschamps, ‘The Free Movement of Workers’,  European Navigator (last update unknown) http://www.ena.lu/free_movement_workers-2-6523, checked 3rd November 2009
^106	  E. Deschamps, ‘The Free Movement of Workers’, European Navigator
^107	  Ibidem
^108	  Consultation on Migration policies vis-à-vis third Countries. European Commission (Brussels 1979) Annex 1. According to the Community’s data, in 1977 Spain had 454000 workers abroad, Portugal 570000
^109	  EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration: Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte (München 2001), 347
^110	  Consultation on Migration policies vis-à-vis Third Countries, 2
^111	  Consultation on Migration policies vis-à-vis Third Countries, 2
^112	  Enlargement of the European Community – Greece – Spain – Portugal. Economic and social committee of the European Community (Brussels 1979) 2
^113	  M. Farrell, ‘Regional integration and cohesion – lessons from Spain and Ireland in the EU’, Journal of Asian Economics 14, (2004) 927 – 946, 935
^114	  EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration, 139
^115	  A. García-Ferrer, ‘Interactions between internal migration, employment growth, and regional income differences in Spain’, Journal of Development Economics 7 (1980)211-229, 212
^116	  García-Ferrer,’ Interactions between internal migration, employment growth, and regional income differences in Spain’, 211/ 212 
^117	  Ibidem, 211
^118	  Ibidem, I, 213
^119	  Farrell, ‘Regional integration and cohesion’, 935
^120	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 12
^121	  General considerations of the problems of enlargement, 7
^122	  General considerations of the problems of enlargement, 7
^123	  Europe information Spain, 1980, 7
^124	  Europe Information Spain 1980, 7
^125	  Consultation on Migration policy vis-a-vis Third Countries, 3
^126	  General considerations of the problems of enlargement, 11
^127	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 15
^128	  Commission communication to the Council on a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged Community, 3
^129	  Consultation on Migration policy vis-a-vis third countries, 9
^130	  Ibidem, Annex page 1
^131	  Ibidem, I, Annex page 2
^132	  Deschamps, ‘The Free Movement of Workers’,  European Navigator
^133	  European Commission, European Regional Development Fund (17th July 2008) http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/feder/index_en.htm , checked 30 December 2009
^134	  European Commission, European Regional Development Fund 
^135	  The free movement of workers in the context of enlargement. European Commission (Brussels 2001) 2
^136	  EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration, 365
^137	  Arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU – advies over de arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU uitgebracht aan de minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2001) 90
^138	  Arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU, 27 
^139	  T. Boeri, H. Brücker, ‘Eastern enlargement and EU labour markets: perceptions, challenges and opportunities’, World Economics (WE) (2001) 9
^140	  Arbeidsmobiliteit in de EU, 91
^141	  Ibidem, 38
^142	  Ibidem, I, 37
^143	  Farrell, ‘Regional integration and cohesion’, 938
^144	  Ibidem, 939
^145	  Kris Pollet, ‘The European Union and migratory pressure from the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe’ in: Marc Maresceau ea., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: a comparative analysis (New York 2001) 344
^146	  Pollet, ‘’ The European Union and migratory pressure’ , 358
^147	  National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis. Government of Turkey (Ankara 2005) 2
^148	  BBC, ‘Ottoman Empire’ (4th September 2009) http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml, checked 25th January 2010
^149	  Matthew Woods, Dr. Hadley Leavell and Dr. Balasundram Maniam, ‘An analysis of Turkey’s prospects of European Union accession’, The Business Review vol. 11 no. 2 (2008) 11-17, 12
^150	  BBC, ‘Ottoman Empire’ 
^151	  Selim Deringel, ‘The Turks and ‘Europe’: the argument from history’, Middle Eastern Studies vol. 43 no. 5 (2007) 709-723,  712
^152	  Naar rustiger vaarwater: een advies over betrekkingen tussen Turkije en de Europese Unie. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Den Haag 1999), 15
^153	  Naar rustiger vaarwater, 15
^154	  Naar rustiger vaarwater, 15
^155	  Ibidem, 16
^156	  M. Hakan Yavuz, Mujeeb R. Khan, ‘Turkey and Europe: will East meet West?’, Current History (2004) 389-393, 390
^157	  Europa, ‘the history of the European Union (last modification unknown) http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm , checked 25th January 2010
^158	  ‘Turkey and the EU: Progress toward accession’, International Debates (2003) 40
^159	  Ali Çarkoglu ed., Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics (London 2003) 4
^160	  Turkey and the EU: Progress towards accession, 40
^161	  Olli Rehn, ‘45 Years from the Signing of the Ankara Agreement: EU-Turkey –cooperation continues’(4th of November 2008)  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/581&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en , checked 25th January 2010
^162	  Çarkoglu ,’Turkey and the European Union’, 17
^163	  Turkey and the EU: Progress towards accession, 40. Hallstein had already said that Turkey was a part of Europe 
^164	  Çarkoglu ,’Turkey and the European Union, 5
^165	  Turkey and the EU: Progress towards accession, 41
^166	  Çarkoglu ,’Turkey and the European Union’, 6
^167	  Ibidem, 5
^168	  José Manuel Durão Barroso, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: The EU/Turkey Partnership’, (11th  April 2008) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/191&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en , checked 25th January 2010
^169	  José Manuel Durão Barroso, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: The EU/Turkey Partnership’
^170	  Turkey and the EU: Progress towards accession, 42
^171	  Çarkoglu ,’Turkey and the European Union’, 6
^172	  Ibidem, 13
^173	  Naar rustiger vaarwater, 19
^174	  Yavuz, ‘Turkey and Europe: Will East meet West?’, 392
^175	  Turkish Foreign Ministry, ‘Main issues Turkey and the EU – EU accession negotiations’ (10th July 2008)    http://www.mfa.gov.tr/eu-accession-negotiations.en.mfa , checked 25th January 2010
^176	 Dr. Mehmet Ugur, ‘The Turkish economy and the EU Connection: the case for moving beyond engineered uncertainty’ in Adam Hug ed.: Turkey in Europe: the economic case for Turkish membership of the EU (London 2008)26-36, 27
^177	  Ugur, ‘The Turkish economy and the EU Connection: the case for moving beyond engineered uncertainty’, 30
^178	  Woods ed.,  ‘An analysis of Turkey’s prospect of European Union accession’, 14
^179	  Erik Jan Zürcher, Een geschiedenis van het moderne Turkije (2nd edition; Amsterdam 2006) 425
^180	  Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU – debating the most difficult enlargement ever’, SAIS Review vol. 26 no. 1 (2006) 147-160, 150
^181	  Marc Maresceau and Edward Lennon ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: a comparative analysis, (New York 2001), xix
^182	  OECD Stat. Extracts, ‘country statistical profiles 2009 – Turkey’ (last modification unkown) http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=18172&querytype=view&lang=en 18th of January 2010
^183	  Regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. European Commission (Brussels 2004)
^184	  Arie Oskam, Natasha Longworth and Irene Molina Vilchez, ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 217-250, 219
^185	 OECD Stat. Extracts, ‘country statistical profiles 2009 – Turkey’ In 2000, Turkey’s Agriculture had a share of 10,8 per cent in the Country’s GDP. In 2007, this number had decreased to 8,7 per cent. 
^186	  European Union, ‘DECISION No 1/95 OF THE EC-TURKEY ASSOCIATION COUNCIL of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc_115267.pdf , checked 18th January 2010Reasonable situations means with the exception of exceptional circumstances, such as animal diseases. 
^187	  Eur-Lex, (last modification unknown)  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21998D0320(01):EN:HTML, checked 18th January 2010
^188	  Oskam, Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey, 218
^189	  European Commission, ‘The DOHA Round’, (1st March 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/doha/ , checked 18th January 2010. Regrettably, the meetings broke down in 2008 over a disagreement on the precise terms of a 'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from overflows in imports. Presently a future for the Doha Round is doubtful. 
^190	  Oskam, ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’, 218
^191	  The World Bank, ‘Turkey – Agricultural Reform Implementation’, (last modification unknown) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20188065~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361712,00.html, 17th January 2010
^192	  The World Bank, ‘Turkey – Agricultural Reform Implementation’ 
^193	  Turkey 2007 progress report. European Commission (Brussels 2007) 45
^194	  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2007-2008. European Commission (Brussels 2007) 9  ‘Major challenges include structural weaknesses and rigidities in the labour market, the quality of skills of the labour force, low employment rates especially for women, a large informal sector and reforms in the social security system and in the energy sector. The diversification of the rural economy remains limited.’
^195	  Turkey: Economic reforms, living standards and social welfare study. World Bank (Washington DC. 2000), 12
^196	  Natasha Longworth, ‘Agricultural production, prices and trade’, in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 57-88, 59
^197	  Tugrul Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 251-278, 266
^198	  Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’ , 255
^199	  Ibidem, 254. Sugar is a highly protected crop in both the EU and Turkey. 
^200	  E. Cakmak, ‘Structural change and market opening in agriculture’, CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers No. 10, Centre for European Studies (Brussels 2004)
^201	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective. European Commission (Brussels 2004) 30
^202	  Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’, 262
^203	  Ibidem, 262
^204	  Tugrul Temel, ‘The institutional framework of Turkey and Turkish agriculture’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 27-56,  39
^205	  Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’, 263
^206	  Turkey and Europe: the decisive year ahead. International Crisis Group (Istanbul/Brussels 2008) 20
^207	  Arie Oskam, ‘Overview of agricultural, food , rural and structural policies’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 127-148, 146
^208	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 31
^209	  Advies van de commissie internationale sociaaleconomische aangelegenheden - De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2004) 45
^210	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 32
^211	  Longworth, ‘Agricultural production, prices and trade’, 71. The number of fruit-bearing trees has increased from about 74 million trees in 1980 to 87 million in 2003. 
^212	  Ibidem, 72
^213	  Oskam, ‘Overview of agricultural, food , rural and structural policies’,131
^214	  A problem for Turkey could be its neighborhood policy. The region has known several problems, but none of them has been as prominent as the non-border confined dilemma with the Kurds. The regional instability caused by the Kurdish dilemma has influenced the Turkish Foreign policy for a long time and will continue to do so, hindering stable relationships with the neighboring countries, such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. Although the Kurdish issue is beyond the scope of this research, it has to be noted because of its influence on the region and inherently on the Turkish neighborhood relations. Nonetheless, relationships are slowly improving.  In 2003 Turkey signed the Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) with some the countries in the region – including Iran. Aim of this agreement was to promote and sustain economic and trade cooperation. This improved relationship is preferably incorporated into the EU as soon as Turkey accedes. A stable border is in the interest of the EU, and long-term trade relations could be what the relationships need. 
^215	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 34
^216	  Oskam, ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’, 218
^217	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 45
^218	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 34
^219	  Oskam, ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’, 228-229
^220	  Ibidem,237
^221	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 46
^222	  Oskam, ‘Consequences for the EU-27 of enlargement to Turkey’, 239
^223	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 38
^224	  Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’,262
^225	  Temel, ‘Expected consequences for Turkey of EU entry in 2015’,263
^226	  Ibidem,259
^227	  Turkey and Europe : the decisive year ahead, 20
^228	  Ibidem, 25
^229	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 46
^230	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 18
^231	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 42
^232	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 42
^233	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 18
^234	  Rafik Erzan, Umut Kusubas and Nilüfer Yildiz, ‘Immigration scenarios: Turkey-EU’, Turkish Studies (TS) vol. 7 no. 1 (2006) 33-44, 33
^235	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 18
^236	  EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräftemigration, 161
^237	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 35
^238	  Pollet, ‘The European Union and migratory pressure’, 335
^239	  Immigration scenarios: Turkey – EU, 33
^240	  Christophe Nillion, ‘Negotiating Turkeys membership: can member states do as they please?’, European Constitutional Law Review vol. 3 (2007) 269–284, 277
^241	  Turkey 2005 progress report. European Commission (Brussels 2005) 59
^242	  Turkey and Europe: the decisive year ahead, 44
^243	  Hubert Krieger and Bertrand Maitre, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, TS vol.7 no.1 (2006) 45-66, 62
^244	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 54
^245	  Ibidem, 55
^246	  Ibidem, I, 54
^247	  National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, 19
^248	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 57
^249	  Naar rustiger vaarwater, 36
^250	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 15
^251	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 45
^252	  Turkey and Europe: the decisive year ahead, 7
^253	  Robert Johnson, ‘Driving towards the EU using its rear-view mirror: Turkey’s “foreigner” policy’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 7 no. 1 (2008) 33-43,  39
^254	  Johnson, ‘Driving towards the EU using its rear-view mirror: Turkey’s “foreigner” policy’, 43
^255	  Proposal for a Council decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey and repealing decision 2006/35/EC. European Commission (Brussels 2007) 10
^256	  Enlargement Strategy and main challenges 2007-2008, 10
^257	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 9
^258	  Arie Oskam, Natasha Longworth and Ayselin Yildiz, ‘Turkey’s economy and regional income distribution’; in A.M. Burrell and A.J. Oskam ed., Turkey in the European Union – Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy (Wageningen 2005) 9-26,  23-24
^259	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 44
^260	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 40
^261	  National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, 19 
^262	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 58
^263	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 45
^264	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 46
^265	  Ibidem, 45
^266	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 9
^267	  Pollet, ‘The European Union and migratory pressure’, 355
^268	  Ibidem, 358
^269	  Europese Raad van Brussel 14/15 december 2006- Conclusies van het voorzitterschap. Raad van de Europese Unie (Brussels 2007) 8
^270	  Pollet, ‘The European Union and migratory pressure’, 358
^271	  Erzan, ‘Immigration scenarios: Turkey – EU’, 33 
^272	  Advies – Arbeidsmigratiebeleid. Sociaal Economische Raad (Den Haag 2007) 34
^273	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 45
^274	  Arbeidsmigratiebeleid 2007, 34
^275	  Adam Hug, ‘Introduction Turkey’s future lies in Europe in Turkey’ in idem ed.: Turkey in Europe: the economic case for Turkish membership of the EU (London 2008) 11-20, 11. The French President Sarkozy has often voiced opposition against Turkish membership, going as far as stating ‘that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation  to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union’ 
^276	  Krieger, ‘Migration trends in an enlarging European Union’, 46
^277	  Arbeidsmigratiebeleid 2007, 40
^278	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 44
^279	  Ibidem, 44
^280	  National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Aqcuis, 19
^281	  Arbeidsmigratiebeleid 2007, 177
^282	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 41
^283	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 40
^284	  Ibidem,  40
^285	  De komende uitbreiding van de EU, in het bijzonder de toetreding van Turkije, 62
^286	  Erzan,’ Immigration scenarios: Turkey – EU’, 34
^287	  Arbeidsmigratiebeleid 2007, 45
^288	  Refik Erzan and Kemal Kirisci, ‘Conclusion’, TS vol. 7 no. 1 (2006) 163-172,  163
^289	  Arbeidsmigratiebeleid 2007, 34
^290	  Proposal for a Council decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, 10
^291	  Naar rustiger vaarwater, 23
^292	  Marc Maresceau, ‘The EU pre-accession strategies; a political and legal analysis’;  in Idem ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: an comparative analysis (New York 2001) 12
^293	  Jean Raux, ‘Towards a pan-Euro-Mediterranean association of proximity’, in Marc Maresceasu ed., The EU’s enlargement and Mediterranean strategies: an comparative analysis (New York 2001) 54  
^294	  Pollet, ‘The European Union and migratory pressure’, 362 
^295	  Ibidem 358
^296	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 43
^297	  Ibidem, 43
^298	  Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, 43
^299	  Turkey 2008 progress report. European Commission (Brussels 2008) 39
^300	  Mededeling van de Commissie – Strategiedocument 2005 over de uitbreiding. European Commission (Brussels 2005) 4
^301	  Erzan, ‘Conclusion’, 167
^302	  Ibidem, 167
^303	  Nillion, ‘Negotiating Turkey’s membership’, 271
^304	  Ibidem,  276
^305	  Mededeling van de Commissie – Strategiedocument 2005 over de uitbreiding, 3
^306	  Erzan, ‘Conclusion’,  170
^307	  Erzan, ‘Immigration scenarios: Turkey – EU’, 41
